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ABSTRACT 
 Hypersonic glide body weapons represent a revolutionary change in offensive 
capabilities for militaries around the world. The U.S. Navy is developing a hypersonic 
glide body capability with the Conventional Prompt Strike Program, which has a 
scheduled initial operational capability of 2025. This capstone project has developed 
candidate systems that describe how the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon 
(LRHW) system could be integrated onto various vessels to deliver a hypersonic glide 
body capability to the Navy before the Conventional Prompt Strike Program is 
operational. Research indicates that the LRHW is the most mature hypersonic glide body 
system developed by the United States, and integrating its use aboard Navy ships is the 
most likely path to success. This capstone describes the user concerns, system 
requirements, and concepts of operation through the development of systems engineering 
products that describe each of the candidate systems. 
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The development of anti-missile defenses by U.S. adversaries has propelled the 
U.S. and the Department of Defense (DOD) to urgently research, test and deploy 
hypersonic glide body weapons. Hypersonic missiles represent a revolutionary change in 
offensive capabilities for militaries around the world. As of 2021, the U.S. does not have a 
hypersonic weapon in its arsenal to counter Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons 
already deployed in the battlefield. The Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development 
Center (SMWDC) has proposed a study to examine multiple navy surface ship platforms 
and perform analysis of how to bring hypersonic missile capability to the surface Fleet by 
FY 2025.  
While the Navy is conducting ongoing testing of its version of a hypersonic missile, 
there is a need to examine alternative launch methods for these missiles from a variety of 
existing surface ships in the near future. The ability to successfully deploy and launch 
hypersonic anti-ship missiles, as well as potentially hypersonic missiles in support of land 
forces, could provide significant advantage to joint forces.  
Research into the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) system has 
shown that the LRHW is currently the most mature hypersonic glide body system 
developed by DOD and could potentially be integrated onto various vessels to deliver a 
hypersonic glide body capability to Navy surface ships. This Capstone project has 
developed three candidate systems that describe a possible integration of the Army’s Long 
Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) system before the Navy’s Conventional Prompt 
Strike Program is operational.  
The three types of vessels considered for the candidate systems were: 1) LPD Class 
Vessel, LRHW with trailer launch, 2) EPF Class Vessel, LRHW AUR with crane launch 
and 3) LCS Class Vessel, LRHW, with trailer launch. The primary attributes identified and 
analyzed were: 1) number of AURs stored; 2) time to implement hypersonic launcher on 




The system analysis was conducted using the Multi-Attribute Value Theory. This 
approach allowed the Capstone Team to assess all attributes with a combination of 
stakeholder preferences over conflicting attributes to discover alternatives with the highest 
value. The team started by determining the multiple attributes that would be used for 
measurement. Only the genuine distinctions between alternatives were used to make 
decisions. Focusing on the differences between our alternatives provided attributes that 
would offer the strongest justification during our decision evaluation. To appropriately 
measure three independent criteria within an additive model we determined a swing weight 
using the Parnell method. The team created a swing weight for each attribute which allows 
for the individual values to be measured together although they do not have similar units. 




Conclusion and Recommendations  
After performing the swing weights analysis of all three attributes, Candidate 
system 1, LPD, scored highest when evaluated based on all three attributes. Close behind 
was Candidate system 3, LCS, while Candidate system 2, EPF, lagged behind considerably.  
We recommend Candidate system 1, LPD, be considered as a possible ship 
platform for a future hypersonic glide body weapon system with additional in-depth 
studies, modeling, and analysis conducted to explore the use of box launchers, LPD trade-
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The DOD provides the president and our diplomats the military options that enable 
them to negotiate from a position of strength. As indicated in the National Defense Strategy 
of 2018, the U.S. “would generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them 
where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested-air, land, 
sea, space, and cyberspace” (Mattis 2018, 3). Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has 
engaged in several different wars and conflicts that have shown that our competitive 
military advantage has declined  along with a pattern of deteriorating relations between 
many nations. China is a strategic competitor and has made huge advances in financial 
growth, military might, and technological development. Russia has continued its 
aggressive behavior throughout Europe and with Iran as an ally, instigate a great deal of 
instability in the Middle East. North Korea also continues with its rhetoric and actions even 
with United Nation’s sanctions in place. Due to the current strategic environment, the 
assumption that the U.S. Navy will continue to maintain dominance at sea is not a foregone 
conclusion. A more lethal, innovative, and resilient U.S. Navy is necessary to maintain the 
capability and strong posture to prevail in case of conflict. 
Since its creation nearly 250 years ago, the United States Navy has operated surface 
combatant vessels organized into Carrier Strike Groups, Amphibious Readiness Groups, 
and Surface Action Groups to keep access of the seas to all sea-worthy vessels and maintain 
U.S. interests according to U.S. foreign policy. But not since World War II has the U.S. 
engaged in major fleet combat. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the U.S. Navy can 
maintain sea control against modern-day adversaries. A recent report by the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Studies, Maritime Competition in a Mature Precision-Strike 
Regime concludes that since the last major U.S. Navy battle in World War II, “advances 
in maritime capabilities have been dramatic. Yet the data on the relative value of these new 
capabilities are meager, culled from minor conflicts that may stimulate as many false 
conclusions as useful insights” (Krepinevich 2014, 3). Recent maritime challenges include 
2 
the Chinese Navy in the Western Pacific and Russian Navy in the Arctic, Baltic, and Black 
Seas. Considering the military and technological advances in hypersonic weapons 
development of the Chinese in recent years, the U.S. Joint Forces face a considerable 
challenge to counter with hypersonic weapons of their own. The Navy’s conventional 
prompt strike currently does not include hypersonic weapons as part of its arsenal. This 
study is aimed at developing the architecture and the strategy for using hypersonic weapons 
in amphibious dock ships (LPD), Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) vessels or Littoral 
Combat Ships (LCS). 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The development and deployment of hypersonic missiles is a major priority for the 
U.S. Armed Forces. While the Navy has conducted testing of its version of the hypersonic 
missile, there is a need to examine alternative launch methods for these missiles from 
existing surface ships in the near future. The ability to successfully deploy and launch 
hypersonic anti-ship missiles, as well as potentially anti-surface missiles in support of land 
forces, could provide a significant advantage to joint forces, particularly in the Pacific 
region.  
The objective of the Rapid Integration of Hypersonic Missile Capability (RIHMC) 
Capstone Team, as provided by the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development 
Center (SMWDC) sponsor, was to develop a system of systems concept that would allow 
for vessel classes such as the Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) or the Amphibious 
Transport Dock Ship (LPD) to ultimately provide a launch platform for hypersonic 
missiles. The team’s efforts were focused on providing an analysis of alternatives for 
adding a hypersonic missile strike capability to ships that are not currently able to launch 
such missiles. The results of the analysis were used to provide recommendations for how 
to add low-cost and versatile offensive capabilities to ships not yet equipped with a vertical 
launching system (VLS). A proof of concept for this approach resulted in a focus on 
available missiles such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)) with subsequent 
application to hypersonic missiles. 
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C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research questions that are addressed throughout this project can be broadly 
placed into three different categories: 
1. Can a system be developed that safely, effectively, and efficiently stores, 
transports, and launches hypersonic missiles from existing Navy platforms 
using launch methods that are not currently employed? How can this 
system accommodate the use of other established missile systems? 
2. Which design considerations of the alternative launching system are the 
most critical to the successful implementation of this offensive strike 
capability?  
3. What are the strategic advantages offered to the fleet by the successful 
implementation of the offensive strike system described?   
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
A four-phased system engineering process with a feedback mechanism was created 
to confirm a meticulous technical approach. Figure 1 illustrates these four phases and how 
the feedback loop allowed for the concerns, requirements, and architecture to be altered if 
results from a subsequent phase require the alteration. This agile mechanism permitted 
concurrent design while working to improve the clarity of our stakeholder’s needs.  
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Figure 1. System engineering approach 
In the problem definition phase, the problem has been defined and bounded by 
performing literature reviews and actively engaging with stakeholders to collect concerns 
about the potential system. These stakeholder concerns, paired with the literature review 
results, were used lockstep during the stakeholder analysis to create a higher probability 
that all needs of our stakeholders were going to be met. The use of the concern construct 
of the systems engineering software chosen for this effort, CORE, allows both 
requirements and functions, both functional and non-functional, to be developed from the 
input collected from stakeholders. The use of concerns as the entry point for stakeholder 
input into the model has also allowed this input to be captured as documenting the concern, 
and ultimately the derived requirements or functions. Phase I has contributed to both 
chapters one and two of this report. 
In the system design phase, the concerns, requirements, and functions that have 
been collected in the first phase were turned into a solution-agnostic system architecture. 
Additionally, a series of measurements of effectiveness were created to assess the 
performance of the candidate systems during the later phases.  
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In the analysis and simulation phase, the potential solutions were mapped to the 
developed architecture. This phase included specific descriptions of potential solutions and 
how the components meet the requirements and perform the functions in the model. The 
ability of the candidate systems’ characteristics and attributes to fulfill the functions and 
requirements of the architecture were determined. The results of this analysis were 
compared to the measurements of effectiveness that were determined in the previous phase.  
Finally, the design evaluation included the design evaluation for each of the 
candidate systems and a set of recommendations for the next steps in the development of 
this system. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis will begin with a Literature Review to describe the classes of vessels 
available in the Navy for the integration of hypersonic missiles, current cruise missile 
technologies and capabilities, and both current and planned hypersonic glide body 
technologies and capabilities available to the DOD. 
Next, the stakeholders in the rapid development of hypersonic missile capabilities 
on board Navy vessels are identified and their concerns regarding the capability are 
presented in the Architecture section. These concerns are organized into white box 
concerns and black box concerns – the former being concerns about the system that are 
dependent upon the manner in which the system is designed, and that latter being concerns 
about the system that are agnostic to the system’s design. A system architecture to capture 
these concerns and develop requirements, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of 
performance (MOPs), and guide system descriptions is also presented. 
A generic hierarchy for a hypersonic launch is presented and used as the basis for 
each of the candidate systems described in the System Development section. Three distinct 
candidate systems are presented, each launching the Army LRHW from a different class 
of vessel. A detailed description of each candidate system is presented, along with 
enhanced functional flow block diagrams (EFFBDs) and DOD Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF) SV-5b matrices describing the operation of each system. 
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The Multi-Attribute Value Theory was used to perform an analysis of the three 
candidate systems to recommend the best system for development. Three attributes of the 
systems were chosen: Number of All-Up- Rounds (AURs) Stored, Time to Implement the 
candidate system, and Time to Execute a missile launch. These attributes were determined 
for each system through an analysis of each systems’ components and simulation using the 
previously developed EFFBDs. Each attribute was associated with a linear piece-wise 
rating curve and swing weight in accordance with the Multi-Attribute Value Theory to 
arrive at relative scores for each system and each attribute. A sensitivity analysis was 
performed on these results. 
Finally, a recommendation for which candidate system to pursue and a description 
of multiple areas for future research to support the rapid development of a hypersonic 
missile capability are presented in the Conclusions and Future Work section. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This project was conducted to determine the highest-ranking alternatives for rapidly 
providing hypersonic missile launching capabilities to the fleet by understanding current 
military technologies. These technologies include ship classes, missile launching systems, 
and different missile types. The history of ship modularity was also investigated to fulfill 
the stakeholder need for rapid implementation to the fleet.   
A. SPEARHEAD-CLASS EXPEDITIONARY FAST TRANSPORT (EPF) 
The Spearhead-class EPF, shown in Figure 2, is a rapid sealift vessel designed to 
allow rapid movement of cargo within theater. It is equipped with a catamaran hull that 
allows it to operate with a shallow draft in the littoral zone. The EPF can provide combatant 
commanders with a high-speed sealift capability. The EPF is not equipped with any 
offensive weapons systems and currently does not have any capability to contribute to an 
offensive strike. 
The EPF can land up to a single CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter on its flight deck 
but cannot place any aircraft into a hangar. The EPF has a mission bay that is located below 
the flight deck and opens to a deployable loading ramp and an extensible boom crane that 
can lift a maximum of 27,000 pounds when fully extended to 49 feet (Christopher 
DeWindt, email to author, January 15, 2021). The mission bay provides an 1,800 m2 area 
for the storage and maneuvering of cargo (Vavasseur 2020). The EPF is not equipped with 
a magazine for the safe storage and munitions. 
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Figure 2. Spearhead-class EPF featuring the flight deck and extensible boom 
crane. Source: Vavasseur (2020). 
B. SAN ANTONIO-CLASS LANDING PLATFORM, DOCK (LPD) 
The San Antonio-class LPD, shown in Figure 3, is an amphibious transport vessel 
capable of launching rotary wing and vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft 
from a flight deck, as well as launching amphibious vehicles such as the Landing Craft Air 
Cushion (LCAC) from its well deck. The flight deck of the LPD is adjacent to a mission 
bay where aircraft are stored and prepared before being towed onto the flight deck for 
launching without the need for an elevator to bring the aircraft to the flight deck. The LPD 
has approximately 640 m2 of area available in its hangar while 2,323 ft2 of space available 
is available in the lower decks to store vehicles for the amphibious force being transported 
(Federation of American Scientists 2000). The LPD also features internal ramp systems 
that allow vehicles that are stored in the vessel to be transported to the mission bay, as 
shown in Figure 4. The LPD also has a volume of 708 m3 available to store munitions in 
two separate ammunition magazines below decks.  
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Figure 3. A San Antonio-class LPD highlighting the mission bay adjacent to 
the flight deck. Source: Seaforce-online Naval Information (n.d.b). 
 
Figure 4. Cutaway diagram of San Antonio-Class LPD highlighting the 
mission bay access from storage via ramp. Image courtesy of Naval 
Warfare Studies Institute (2021). 
C. INDEPENDENCE-CLASS LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP  
The Independence-class littoral combat ship (LCS), shown in Figure 5, is a vessel 
designed to perform a multitude of combat roles while operating close to shore. The LCS 
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is equipped with a flight deck and hangar space that can accommodate operations with a 
single MH-60 Seahawk helicopter alongside other unmanned aerial reconnaissance 
vehicles. The hangar of the Independence-class LCS provides an area of 351 m2 while the 
cargo space located in the deck below the flight deck and hangar provides an area 1,410 
m2 for storage. This cargo area and the hangar are connected by an elevator with a length 
of approximately 20 feet (Seaforces-online Naval Information n.d.a). The bow of the 
Independence-class LCS can be equipped with box launchers that can currently 
accommodate missiles like the Naval Strike Missile. The LCS is equipped with magazine 
storage for ammunition only for its onboard weapons systems, not for any weapon systems 
that are carried as cargo. 
 
Figure 5. Independence-class LCS highlighting the flight deck and bow 
missile launchers. Source: Seaforce-online Naval Information (n.d.a). 
D. TOMAHAWK LAND ATTACK MISSILE  
The Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) is a cruise missile that can currently 
be launched from the Mk 41 VLS or other established launching systems. The TLAM is a 
11 
sub-sonic missile, with a top speed of about 500 miles per hour and a maximum range of 
approximately 1,000 miles and physical dimensions of 20 inches in diameter, 20.5 feet 
long, and 3,500 pounds (Missile Defense Project 2021). The newest block of the TLAM is 
equipped with a GPS enables targeting system that allows the missile to update its flight 
path during its travel to the target and to be able to loiter while waiting for additional assets 
to be available for an attack or a target to be available to attack. This allows the TLAM to 
approach from headings and angles that may not be expected by enemy defenses. With its 
relatively slow speed, the TLAM relies upon its low flight altitude to reduce its exposure 
to detection by enemy radar systems. According to Nicholls (2020), the slow airspeed of 
the TLAM makes individual TLAMs exceptionally vulnerable to active air defenses. In 
some scenarios, a combat air patrol (CAP) of four F-15 fighters equipped with air-to-air 
missiles would be able to successfully intercept an attack consisting of eight TLAMs 
(Nicholls 2020, 24). The number of TLAMs that are required to overwhelm the active 
defenses of a target will vary based on the number and types of defenses, however, it is 
unusual for dozens of TLAMs to be launched at a target to ensure that its defenses are 
penetrated, and the target destroyed. Figure 6 shows a TLAM being launched from a single 
cell of an Mk41 VLS while an additional 31 TLAMs could be loaded in the remaining cells 
of the VLS. 
 
Figure 6. A TLAM being launched from a Mk 41 Launcher. Source: 
LaGrone (2020). 
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E. HYPERSONIC MISSILES 
Hypersonic missiles can be broadly separated into two different categories: 
hypersonic glide body systems and hypersonic cruise missile systems. The hypersonic 
glide body system consists of a booster rocket with a hypersonic glide vehicle attached as 
a warhead. The booster rocket launches in a trajectory that starts like a standard 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) but releases the hypersonic glide vehicle early in 
the trajectory, allowing the glide vehicle to maneuver to its target while moving at Mach 5 
or faster (Congressional Research Service 2021, 2). These hypersonic glide vehicles are 
not powered by a rocket motor but instead rely upon the kinetic energy imparted to them 
from the booster rocket to reach their target. 
1. Common Hypersonic Glide Body 
The U.S. Army and U. S. Navy have collaborated since 2018 to develop a common 
hypersonic glide vehicle, now known as the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB), 
shown in Figure 7. The C-HGB takes the place of the warhead in a conventional ballistic 
missile and can be equipped with several different types of missiles. Two missile systems 
that have been equipped with the C-HGB, or precursors to the current glide vehicle, include 
the Minotaur IV rocket and Trident II missiles (Congressional Research Service 2020, 13). 
The use of the C-HGB on these missiles is important because of the size of the missiles; 
the Minotaur IV weighs 95 tons and is nearly 80 feet tall (Space Launch Report 2020) 
while the Trident II weighs 65 tons and is nearly 45 feet tall (Federation of American 
Scientists 1998). While the Minotaur IV is not intended for offensive strike missions, the 
Trident II is equipped on the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine and could be 
equipped with a C-HGB warhead. While it may generally hold true that the more power a 
boost missile carrying a C-HGB has, the further the range of the C-HGB, it is not clear 
how the capabilities of the boost missile will directly affect the C-HGB’s performance. 
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Figure 7. Common hypersonic glide body. Source: Jones-Bonbrest (2019). 
2. U.S. Navy Conventional Prompt Strike 
The U.S. Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program is aiming to pair the 
C-HGB warhead with an intermediate-range ballistic missile to provide hypersonic missile 
capabilities to the Virginia-class submarine. A new booster is being developed for the CPS 
that will be able to launch the C-HGB from the recently developed Virginia Payload 
Module (VPM) (Congressional Research Service 2020, 22). The program is slated to have 
an FY2028 initial operational capability (IOC). 
The VPM is an upgrade for the Virginia-class nuclear-guided missile submarine. 
The VPM will replace a number of the current missile launch tubes on the submarine and 
give the submarine a modular capability for increased mission flexibility (Eckstein 2017). 
The VPM will be able to accommodate the launch and retrieval of underwater unmanned 
vehicles, contain seven TLAM missiles, contain yet undetermined hypersonic cruise 
missiles, or house an intermediate-range missile capable of being equipped with a 
hypersonic glide vehicle. Regardless of the final configuration, the VPM represents a self-
contained weapons platform that can meet a number of different missions, including the 
launch of a C-HGB equipped missile. 
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3. U.S. Army Long Range Hypersonic Weapon 
The U.S. Army is developing a hypersonic glide body missile system under the 
Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program, with an IOC of 2023 (Neil 2019). 
The LRHW consists of an AUR, a trailer for mounting the AURs, an M983A4 tractor for 
maneuvering the system, and an Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
(AFATDS) operations center (Trevithick 2021). The LRHW is a collaboration between the 
U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy that uses the C-HGB attached to a booster missile whose 
development has not yet been completed. The LRHW AUR, shown in Figure 8, consists 
of a canister that contains the booster and C-HGB in a state that is ready to be loaded onto 
the trailer and launched. The trailer system is a modified U.S. Army M870 trailer that can 
hold two AURs simultaneously. 
 
Figure 8. An inert training AUR for the LRHW program. Source: Trevithick 
(2021). 
The M870 trailer, shown in Figure 9 equipped with LRHW AURs, is 42 feet long, 
8 feet wide, 5.5 feet tall and can carry up to 40 tons (Headquarters, Department of the Army 
1999). The individual weights of the AUR’s are not known, but the fact that the M870 can 
carry two simultaneously gives an upper bound of 20 tons for an individual AUR.  
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Figure 9. M870 trailers equipped with two LRHW AURs each. Source: 
Thurgood (2019). 
F. VESSEL MODULARITY 
J. Schank articulates the concept of modularity and flexibility to build adaptable 
ships to reduce cost and time in the book Design Adaptable Ships: Modularity and 
Flexibility in Future Ship Designs (Schank 2016). He provides insight into the different 
definitions of modularity that currently exist in the infrastructure of ships and how these 
definitions can be used to keep the Navy ships progressing in a modular dynamic. These 
definitions are broken out into three different concepts.  
First Schank describes common modules used across multiple class ships as 
structural pieces that are built and tested in factory-like environments (Schank 2016). 
Second, he describes the next concept as self-contained modules that provide a plug-and-
play capability. He uses the example of a vertical launch system as being designed on a 
specific class ship but providing a specific interface and functionality of missile launching. 
His last concept is explained as structure and services that can be interchanged or installed 
as needed. These modular installations provide a ship with flexibility although the 
interfaces have much broader boundaries.  
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The concept of modifying the original design or even the mission of a ship is not 
new in the U.S. Navy. For instance, the Navy has been interested in enhancing the original 
mission and capabilities of the LPD since 2016 (Harper 2016).  
These exchanges with Huntington Ingalls Industries contributed to the award of a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for life cycle engineering and support services of the LPD 
(Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. 2021). Huntington Ingalls Industries has realized the 
necessity to adapt current ships to have new capabilities, stating “We look forward to 
supporting these ships as they evolve to meet the changing environment” (Huntington 
Ingalls Industries, Inc. 2021). Services to supply the Navy with system engineering and 
integration are highlighted in the news release titled Ingalls Shipbuilding Awarded Life-
Cycle Engineering Contract on U.S. Navy’s LPD Program (Huntington Ingalls Industries 
Inc, 2021). 
Another supporter of the idea of flexible ships is Glen Sturtevant, Director for 
Science and Technology for the Navy Sea Systems Command. In a brief entitled, “Flexible 
Ships” Sturtevant (2015) discusses the benefits of providing modifications to, “Provide the 
warfighting requirements that will drive flexible, common, and open architectures into our 
ship designs and acquisitions.” Such an approach could bring hypersonic missile launching 
capability to the fleet rapidly. 
Due to the recent interest within the Navy to pursue a surface ship launch platform 
for a hypersonic glide missile, modifying ships such as the LPD and EPF by installing a 
missile launch capability may offer a cost-effective and rapid solution. 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION 
The literature review for this project focused on describing the current capabilities 
and attributes of the ships that could be used or modified to achieve additional hypersonic 
missile capabilities, the current capabilities of the non-hypersonic missile systems that 
these vessels are equipped with, and finally the likely attributes of the hypersonic missiles 
that could be equipped on the vessels. The vessels and hypersonic missiles were combined 
in a variety of ways to create candidate systems for achieving the hypersonic missile 
capability. The non-hypersonic missile capabilities were presented to establish the current 
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state of missile strike capabilities and provide the background for a comparison of the 
potential hypersonic missile capability of each candidate system. 
The research performed on the vessels and weapons systems that could be used to 
achieve the goal of rapidly equipping a surface vessel with a hypersonic strike capability, 
indicates that there is the potential for several different combinations of candidate systems. 
Several generalizations can be made about the state of hypersonic missiles on surface 
vessels: 
1. None of the vessels studied have a current ballistic missile launching 
capability or an obvious way to install a ballistic missile launching 
capability. The same holds true for traditional sub-sonic cruise missile 
capabilities. Significant modification of the vessels or the use of missile 
launching systems not permanently installed on the vessels will be needed. 
2. The exact physical configuration of a boost missile equipped with a C-
HGB is still unknown. While the LRHW AUR provides a reasonable 
definition for the size and weight requirements to launch the C-HGB, it is 
possible that a smaller boost missile could be used or that a larger boost 
missile would be required for the mission at hand. This size requirement 
precludes the use of current launching systems like the Mk 41 VLS for 
launching C-HGB equipped ballistic missile, but it does not necessarily 
preclude hypersonic scramjet equipped cruise missiles from being fit into 
current systems like the Mk 41 VLS. 
3. There are no programs for launching the C-HGB that are more mature 
than the LRHW. While the Navy’s CPS program will equip the Virginia-
class submarine with a hypersonic glide vehicle strike capability, it is not 
slated for IOC until 2028. The boost missile system that will be used for 
this capability is not yet clear and no information could be found on it. 
This iteration of the C-HGB equipped missile will have to fit either in the 
standard missile tubes currently equipped or the upgraded VPM. It is 
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reasonable to assume that the VPM will be able to accommodate the 
equipping and use of a C-HGB equipped ballistic missile. 
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III. ARCHITECTURE 
A simple architecture was developed to allow the concerns of identified 
stakeholders to be captured. These concerns are recorded as white box concerns or black 
box concerns. The concerns result in the development of requirements, MOEs, and MOPs 
that will later help to guide the development of the candidate systems. 
A. ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTION 
The Hypersonic Missile Launching System architecture design aimed to document 
stakeholder concerns and requirements and map them to the functions and components of 
the candidate systems. The architecture starts with stakeholders providing concerns about 
the potential system. A requirements analysis results in requirements from these concerns 
to address the issues or questions that the stakeholders have raised. Finally, a functional 
analysis translates system requirements into design criteria and identification of the 
resources required for the system to operate (Fabrycki 2011, 86). Figure 10 shows this 
schema, which is derived from the CORE DoDAF v2.02 Schema. 
 
Figure 10. Architecture schema 
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B. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION  
Performing stakeholder analysis facilitates delivering a high-quality product. This 
analysis allowed the RIHMC Capstone Team to identify key concerns that our stakeholders 
might have as well as understand their impact on our system. Actively engaging with all 
stakeholders, produces a higher probability that the finished product will meet the users’ 
needs and requirements and perform as expected. The RIHMC Capstone Team has 
researched the mission of each stakeholder to support the determination of the primary 
concerns for each stakeholder represented in Table 1. These concerns are the first tier of 
the hypersonic missile launching architecture and are described in more detail in Tables 2 
and 3.  
Table 1. Stakeholder primary concerns 
Stakeholder Primary Concerns 
Surface Warfare Directorate (OPNAV N96) 
Con.2.3-How does the new hypersonic 
missile system impact other weapon 
systems in other combat ships? 
 
Con.1.1.1-What training will be 
required for the personnel to operate 
the hypersonic missile launching 
system? 
 
Con.1.5 -What targeting features will 
the system have? 
 
Con 1.3.1 -How many missiles will the 
system be able to launch? 
Navy’s Resource Sponsor for Expeditionary 
Warfare (OPNAV N95) 
Con.1.1-How would the new missile 
launching capabilities on the LPDs 
and EPFs impact personnel manpower 
and training to be able to maintain 
readiness?   
 
Con.1.5 -Is the missile launching 
system targeting reliable? 
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Stakeholder Primary Concerns 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
Con.2.5-What research still needs to 
be conducted to obtain an effective 
hypersonic missile within a few years?  
 
Con.2.5-What measurements of 
effectiveness were applied to the 
candidate systems? 
 
Con.1.4-How will the missile be 
stored? 
Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting 
Development Center (SMWDC) 
Con.2.3-Is the hypersonic missile 
launching system suitable for LPD and 
EPF vessels?  
 
Con.1.3-What is the impact to the 
operational mission of the Amphibious 
Task Force with this new missile 
launching capability? 
United States Fleet Forces Command (USFF) 
Con.1.3-How does the hypersonic 
missile system contribute to the fleet’s 
capabilities and mission sets?  
 
Con.1.1-What personnel will be 
required on the vessel to operate the 
hypersonic missile launching system? 
Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare 
Systems (PEO IWS) 
Con.2.4-How long would the 
hypersonic missile launching system 
implementation take? 
 Program Executive Office Ships (PEO Ships) 
Con.1.2-What operational changes 
need to be made to the LPD or EPF   
to accommodate the launching 
system? 
 
OPNAV N95 is the Navy’s resource sponsor for expeditionary warfare. “The 
organization establishes requirements, sets priorities, and directs overall planning and 
programming for expeditionary warfare systems and related manpower, training, and 
readiness” (Campbell 2018). OPNAV N95 concerns are personnel, training, and planning 
required for the successful integration of the hypersonic missile launching system. 
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“OPNAV N96, the Surface Warfare Directorate, is responsible for the 
determination of force levels, shipboard and related support requirements, and major 
features of programs involving weapon systems, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, command 
ships, patrol craft, and littoral combat ships” (Campbell 2018).  
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is a branch of the United States Department 
of the Navy that focuses on the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ research and technology 
projects. The aim of the Office of Naval Research is to outline and develop scientific 
research to preserve future naval strength and ensure national security. (Welcome Aboard 
2021) 
The Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) 
provides sponsorship to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) for scientific research and 
investigations. 
One mission of the United States Fleet Forces Command (USFF) is to “Train, 
certify and provide combat-ready Navy forces to combatant commanders that are capable 
of conducting prompt, sustained naval, joint and combined operations in support of U.S. 
national interests.” (Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command 2021).  
Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) and 
PEO Ships are responsible for the development, delivery, and sustainability 
of operationally dominant combat systems for Sailors. The Program 
Executive Office Ships manages the acquisition and complete life-cycle 
support for all U.S. Navy non-nuclear surface ships. These ships range from 
frontline combatants to amphibious ships that transport Marines and their 
equipment to supply and replenish cargo ships. For these and all other non-
nuclear surface craft, PEO Ships maintains “cradle to grave” responsibility 
including research, development, acquisition, systems integration, 
construction, and lifetime support. (Commander Naval Sea Systems 
Command 2021)  
PEO stakeholders would be concerned with the steps necessary for implementation as well 
as additional research that may need to be conducted for rapid but successful execution of 
this system within the vessels. 
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C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
For any systems engineering process, the needs analysis identifies the goals and 
stakeholders of each user and records them. Due to the complexity of the system, the 
solution-independent needs are fundamental in having a complete scope of the system. The 
concerns generated by the stakeholder’s analysis have been distributed into the design of 
the hypersonic missile launching system architecture. The RIHMC Team established an 
architectural development approach consistent with Aleksandraviciene and Morkevicius 
(Aleksandraviciene 2018).  
There are two categories that stakeholder concerns can fall into white box concerns 
and black box concerns. White box concerns are concerns that deal with the mechanisms 
of how the system will operate and what its components are. In the context of this project, 
an example of a white box concern would be the ability to store the LRHW AUR safely 
onboard a vessel. This concern would result in a requirement that would need a component 
or sub-system of the system to be designed or operated in a specific way.  
Table 2. White box concerns 
Number Element Description 
Con.1.1 
Personnel Required 
for Missile Launch 
Mission 
There will need to be a group of personnel that are 
trained in the use of the LRHW. The extra burden 
of this Army-based training that would normally be 
done by an artillery group could be significant. 
Con.1.2 Personnel Required to Authorize Attack 
An officer with the ability to authorize an offensive 
first strike must be present on the vessel 
Con.1.3 Operational Area Concerns The new system will need to fill a capability gap 
Con.1.4 Vessel Mission Concerns 
Converting some of a vessel’s capabilities to a 
missile capability may alter the vessel’s mission 
significantly 
Con.1.5 Onboard Missile Storage 
The missiles must be able to be stored safely on 
board the vessel 
Con.1.6 Onboard Missile Movement 
The missiles must be able to be moved around the 
vessel to be prepared for launch. This concern is 
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Number Element Description 
not valid if the missiles are loaded into a dedicated 
launcher 
Con.1.7 Missile Targeting Concerns 






 The weather may affect the ability to launch 
missiles. 
Con.1.9 Sea State Affecting Launch 
 The sea state may affect the ability to launch 
missiles. 
Con.1.10 Missile Launch Damaging Vessel 
 The exhaust of the missile must not cause damage 
to the surface of the ship it is being launched from 
 
Black box concerns are concerns that exist agnostic of the internal mechanisms of 
the system. An example of a black box concern would be the effect of the system’s 
capability on fleet planning. In this example, the capability of launching the hypersonic 
missile is what is critical to the concern while how the hypersonic missile is launched is 
unimportant. Concerns will be generated in one of these two categories and presented in 
separate hierarchies. 
Table 3. Black box concerns 










LOS or satellite radio and voice data 
communications with Command and Control  
Con.2.1.2 Mission Operations Data Concerns 
Link 16 network communication and exchange 
of sensor information, creating a common 
operating picture (COP)  
Con.2.2 Vessel Environment Concerns 
Concerns regarding the environment the vessel 
will operate in  
Con.2.2.1 Meteorological Data Concerns 
Ability to accurately receive GMDSS data or 
predictive weather data such as barometric 
pressure 
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Number Element Description 
Con.2.3 Existing System Integration 
The system must have integrability with existing 
systems. 
Con.2.4 Rapid Implementation Concerns about how quickly the system can be implemented 
Con.2.5 Testing & Research Concerns 
Concerns about what testing and research has 
been completed 
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IV. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
The candidate systems were developed by collecting concerns, mapping 
requirements to concerns, developing MOEs and MOPs, and then proposing mechanisms 
to launch the LRHW from several different Naval vessels. The concerns, requirements, 
MOEs and MOPs, and a description of each candidate system, including several systems 
engineering views, were recorded in the model-based systems engineering tool CORE. 
This section of the paper describes the process of developing the candidate system from 
concern to EFFBD. 
A. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
System requirements are requirements that describe the functions that the system 
should complete to satisfy stakeholder concerns and are stated in a collection of statements, 
views, and non-functional requirements. The non-functional requirements of the system 
reflect the levels of safety, availability, dependability, and other factors that the system will 
need to achieve (Faisandier 2021). After concerns and technical approach have been 
identified the translation of requirements is generated to help identify areas of the system 
that may be inconsistent, incomplete, or unrealistic (Kossiakoff et al. 2020). Figure 11 is a 
visual representation of the hierarchy of stakeholder concerns identified in the stakeholder 
analysis which result in requirements of the hypersonic missile launching system. 
 
Figure 11. A diagram of concerns resulting in requirements 
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B. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
The following scenario is intended to provide the means to evaluate MOPs and 
MOEs for two very different types of surface ships modified to launch hypersonic glide 
missiles, each ship type offering unique operational advantages.  
Country Red is installing a modern ICBM launch site on its mainland. This 
site could launch ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missile) capable of 
reaching Country Blue’s major cities/military bases as well as military bases 
and partner nations in the Azure Ocean. Country Blue has equipped five 
surface vessels (three near-ashore/littoral class ships; one blue-water large 
deck amphibious class ship) with the ability to launch hypersonic missiles. 
Each near-ashore/littoral type ship can carry one such missile; the large deck 
amphibious ship can carry five such missiles. All of these missiles would 
have the range to strike Country Red’s ICBM launch site based upon the 
launch vessel’s assigned operating area. Country Red has sophisticated ISR 
capability and could be expected to strike any ship launching such a missile. 
The likelihood is that it would take more than one hypersonic missile to 
eliminate the ICBM launch site. 
Figure 12 shows the three littoral class ships firing their single hypersonic missile 
and the blue water ship firing its three hypersonic missiles at the hypothetical ICBM site. 
Country Red’s anti-ship weapon (ASW) sites are shown returning fire on the vessels that 
carried out the hypersonic missile strike with anti-ship missile systems located further 
inland, but not with direct fire from shore batteries. 
 
 
Figure 12. OV-1 of the operational scenario presented 
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C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE 
The MOEs of a system are defined by the Defense Acquisition University to be 
“The data used to measure the military effect (mission accomplishment) that comes from 
using the system in its expected environment.”  The MOPs of a system are defined by 
Green to be “measures derived from the dimensional parameters (both physical and 
structural) and measure attributes of system behavior.” Other examples of performance 
parameters that are MOPs include speed, weight, range, or rate of fire. Table 4 shows 
MOEs and MOPs that are derived from the white box concerns developed earlier in the 
model and Table 5 shows MOEs and MOPs that are derived from black box concerns. 
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Table 4. MOEs and MOPs derived from model white box concerns 
Measure of 
Effectiveness Measure of Performance Model Concern 
Crews can launch the 
missile 
 Con.1.1 Personnel Required for Missile Launch 
  
 Con.1.2 Personnel Required to Authorize Launch 
System can be used 
while vessel deployed  
Con.1.3 Operational Area 
Concerns 
 
Con.1.4 Vessel Missile 
Concerns 
No degradation of 
other vessel missions 
 Con.1.4 Vessel Missile 
Concerns 
Missile can be stored 
on the vessel 
Number of AURs a vessel can 
store 
Con.1.5 On Board Missile 
Storage 
Missile can be moved 
throughout the vessel 
Time required to move missile 
from storage to ready-to-launch 
state 
Con.1.6 On Board Missile 
Movement 
Missile system’s C2 
system is compatible 
with the vessel’s C2 
systems by launching 
missile 
 
Time required to apply mission 
data package  
Con.1.7 Missile Targeting 
Concerns 
Authorization to fire 
can be received 
 Con.1.7 Missile Targeting 
Concerns 
Missile can be 
launched 
Maximum wind speed missile can 
be launched under 
  
Con.1.8 Meteorological Events 
Affecting Launch 




Missile launch rate 
  
Con.1.9 Sea State Affecting 
Launch 
Time required to launch missile 
from neutral vessel state.  
   
Missile launching is 
compatible with the 
type of vessel 
Chance of damaging vessel with 
launch 
Con.1.10 Missile Launch 
Damaging Vessel 
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Table 5. MOEs and MOPs derived from model black box concerns 
Measure of 
Effectiveness Measure of Performance Model Concern 





 Con.2.1.1 Voice Communications Concerns 
   





 Con. 2.1.2 Mission Operations Data Concerns 
  
System can be used 
while vessel deployed 
 Con. 2.2 Vessel Environment 
Concerns 
System can be used 
while vessel deployed 
 Con. 2.2.1 Meteorological Data 
Concerns 
System can be 
integrated into the 
vessel and the Fleet 
 Con.2.3 Existing System 
Integration Concerns 
System can be 
implemented into fleet 
vessel 
Number of years until operation Con.2.4 Rapid Implementation Concerns 
  
Field testing have 
yielded satisfactory 
results 
 Con 2.5 Testing & Research 
Concerns 
   




D. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS  
The four primary areas of operational activity that have been identified for the 
system are: 
• Storing the missiles – this includes the logistical front end of getting both 
the missiles and whatever launching system that will exist into ship 
storage. 
• Preparing the missiles for launch – this includes setting up the missile 
launching system, moving the missiles to the launcher, and loading the 
missiles. 
• Launching the missiles – this includes providing the missiles with 
targeting information, launching the missile, and recovering the launcher 
to be able to fire again if the ship will have multiple missiles. 
• Retrograding the launcher – this includes breaking down the launcher for 




Figure 13. Generic operational activity hierarchy. 
These solution-agnostic activities, shown in Figure 13 are required to be able to 
launch missiles from a ship that is not currently equipped with a missile launching 
capability. These functions provide the framework through which the analysis of the 
missile system and vessel combinations was completed. 
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E. ALTERNATIVE GENERATION 
1. LPD Class Vessel, LRHW, Trailer Launch 
This candidate system will launch the Army LRHW AUR directly from the M870 
trailer. The M870 trailer, the AURs, and potentially the AFATDS will be stowed aboard 
the LPD until the missile launch is needed. All guided hypersonic missiles should be stored 
in accorance with the Navy’s explosives safety afloat regulations, detailed in NAVSEA OP 
4, Twelfth Revision of 15 July 2019. When the need for a hypersonic missile launch 
becomes apparent, the M870 and LRHW AURs will be transported from the below deck 
storage into the mission bay adjacent to the flight deck. In the mission bay, the AURs will 
be loaded onto the M870 trailers and any connections to power or data sources will be 
made. Once the AUR and the M870 are prepared to fire, they will be transported to the 
flight deck. The most effective orientation concerning the LPD flight deck and the sea state 
requirements for the launch of the missile are unknown. The LRHW will be fired using 
standard procedures developed for launching on land. Figure 14 shows a conceptual 
drawing of the system launching an LRHW from an LPD flight deck. 
 
Figure 14. Rendering of LPD/LRHW concept. Adapted from Seaforces-
Online Naval Information (n.d.b). 
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After launching the missile, or missiles, from the M870, the trailer will be recovered 
and transported back into the mission bay. Further launches will be determined by the 
ability to acquire additional targets, the number of AURs available to be loaded, and the 
state of the M870 trailer after the initial launch. 
a. Candidate System 1 Sub-system and SV-5b 
A DoDAF SV-5b Operation Activity to Systems Traceability Matrix diagram for 
candidate system 1 is shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Candidate system 1 SV-5b 
In this SV-5b, the systems and sub-systems required for the operation of the LRHW 
onboard the LPD are identified and linked to the operational activities that they perform. 



















OA.1.1.1 CS1 Store Missiles X
OA.1.1.2 CS1 Store Launcher X
OA.1.1.3 CS1 Move Launcher to Mission Bay X
OA.1.1.4 CS1 Move Missiles to Mission Bay X
OA.1.2.1 CS1 Load Missile into Launching System X
OA.1.2.2 CS1 Move System to Flight Deck X
OA.1.3.1 CS1 Receive Notice to Start Mission X
OA.1.3.2 CS1 Acquire Targets X
OA.1.3.3 CS1 Apply Missile Targeting Information X
OA.1.3.4 CS1 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable X
OA.1.3.5 CS1 Launch Missile X
OA.1.4.1 CS1 Move Spent System to Mission Bay X
OA.1.4.2 CS1 Breakdown Missile Launcher X
OA.1.4.3 CS1 Move Launcher to Storage X
OA.1.4.4 CS1 Move Spent AUR to Storage X
OA.1.4.5 CS1 Verify Integrity of Other Missions X
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1. LPD – see below for a full explanation. 
2. Trailer – this is the M870 trailer that the LRHW AURs will be launched 
from 
3. Tractor – this is the mechanism by which the trailer will be conveyed. It 
will either be a native LPD capability or the M983A4 that is currently 
included in the terrestrial LRHW system. 
4. Mission Bay Lift – this mechanism could either be some sort of crane or 
lift that is already in place in the mission bay, or an additional component 
of the system to perform the lifting like a Kalmar RT240 shown earlier. 
5. C2 – this is the command-and-control system that will be used to receive 
mission packages, launch authorizations, and transfer mission data to the 
LRHW AUR prior to launching. In the LPD this system will either be the 
AFATDS that is included in the terrestrial LRHW system or the Tactical 
Tomahawk Weapons Control System (TTWCS). 
 
The system labeled “LPD” is intended to be an overarching group of capabilities 
that are provided by the host vessel. The sub-systems that are included in this category are: 
 
1. The munition storage system, to include meeting requirements outlined in 
OP-4.  
2. The launcher storage location. 
3. A system that can safely move the LRHW AURs from storage to the 
mission bay. 
4. Vessel procedures and personnel are required to make statements about 
the state of the vessel, (i.e., whether it is safe to launch the missile and 
whether the vessel has been appropriately retrograded and is ready to 
conduct its other missions). 
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b. Operational Activities and EFFBD 
Figure 16 shows the enhanced functional flow block diagram for the candidate 
system comprised of the LPD and LHRW using an M870 trailer as the launching platform. 
The EFFBD describes the operational activities, outputs, and triggers that are needed to 
conduct the successful launching of a single load of hypersonic missiles onto an M870 
trailer. This EFFBD does not consider the potential for a misfire requiring remediation or 
reloading the M870 trailer to launch additional missiles. 
 
Figure 16. EFFBD for trailer launch of LRHW from an LPD. 
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OA.1.1.0 Store Missile System: The missile system must be safely stored on the 
LPD. The M870 trailer is comparable to other vehicles that the LPD normally carries in its 
hold and can be treated as such. The AURs for the LRHW will need to be stored in a safe 
location within the hold of the ship, most likely in the same place that the munitions for the 
embarked assault force are stored.  
OA.1.1.1 Store Missiles: The missiles will be stored as AURs. The total number 
of missiles that can be stored for use will depend on the exact dimensions of the missiles, 
the exact dimensions of the storage space, and the number of other munitions that will need 
to be removed to accommodate the storage of the AURs.  
OA.1.1.2 Store Launcher: The M870 trailer will be stored in the same hold as the 
vehicles for the embarked assault force. 
OA.1.1.3 Move Launcher to Mission Bay:  The M870 trailer will be moved to 
the mission bay using the elevator connecting the lower holds to the mission bay. The 
dimensions of the mission bay elevator must be able to accommodate the size and weight 
of the M870 trailer. 
OA.1.1.4 Move Missiles to Mission Bay:  The AURs will be removed from their 
storage location and moved into the mission back using the mission bay elevator in the 
same manner that the M870 trailer was moved.  
OA.1.2.0 Prepare Missile for Launch: After the launcher and missile are 
collocated, they must be configured to prepare for launch. 
OA.1.2.1 Load Missile into Launching System: The AUR or AURs in the 
mission bay will be loaded onto the M870 trailer using the mission bay lift. 
OA.1.2.2 Move System to Flight Deck: Once the M870 trailer has been loaded 
with the AURs and the targeting information has been provided to the missiles, the ready-
to-launch system will be transported to the flight deck. The entire process of transportation 
is not fully understood, but the most desirable method would be to use a tractor that is 
currently used on the LPD to move aircraft in and out of the mission bay. If this tractor is 
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not capable of moving the loaded M870, then another vehicle will need to be added to the 
system to accomplish this function. 
In addition to the M870 trailer that will need to move onto the flight deck, a blast 
shield will need to be placed on the flight deck to protect the surface from the hot exhaust 
gases of the LRHW launching. This blast shield is not a part of the LHRW system and has 
not yet been designed. This will address Concern 1.6.3  
OA.1.3.0 Launch Missiles: The steps that are required to start the launching 
process and launch the missile at the target. 
OA.1.3.1 Receive Notice to Start Mission: The portion of the command-and-
control center that is responsible for receiving orders to conduct offensive strikes will 
initiate the launch process by receiving the orders to launch the missile. The personnel who 
are responsible for receiving and disseminating the orders will notify the chain of command 
that a hypersonic missile launch is being. 
OA.1.3.2 Acquire Mission Data Package: The mission data package for the 
hypersonic missile strike be provided from a system external to the LPD, likely a satellite 
connection to a Naval Operations center. The need for the AFATDS to be included in the 
system will depend upon the ability of the LPD’s current fire control systems to either 
provide the information required in their current state or be modified and upgraded to be 
able to provide the required information. If the LPD’s fire control systems are going to be 
used to perform this function, there will likely need to be software development to provide 
a system that can translate the output of the LPD’s fire control systems to a format 
compatible with the input required for the LRHW. The most likely system to upgrade the 
LPD’s native fire control system would be the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control 
System (TTWCS). If the AFATDS is used for this function, its storage, transportation, 
setup, and use will need to be accounted for in the system.  
OA.1.3.3 Acquire Launch Approval: In addition to the mission data package, the 
command approval to launch the LRHW will also be acquired. 
OA.1.3.4 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable: After the system is in place 
on the flight deck an assessment of the firing environment will be made. This includes final 
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checks on the readiness of the system and safety considerations regarding the personnel 
and equipment on or near the flight deck.  
OA.1.3.5 Launch Missile: After the firing environment has been determined to be 
acceptable the missiles will be launched at their target. This function is entirely determined 
by the missile launching process determined by the LHRW system. 
OA.1.4.0 Retrograde Missile Launcher: After the missile launch has occurred 
additional steps will be taken to recover the spent launcher and prepare for the vessel to 
conduct its other missions. 
OA.1.4.1 Move Spent System to Mission Bay: After the missile has been 
successfully launched, the M870 trailer will be returned to the mission bay using the same 
manner of transportation that was used to get the M870 trailer onto the flight deck. 
OA.1.4.2 Breakdown Missile Launcher: Once the system is back in the mission 
bay, the launcher will be disassembled by removing the AUR using the same lift system 
that was used to put the AUR onto the trailer. 
OA.1.4.3 Move Launcher to Storage: The launcher will be assessed, prepared for 
storage, and moved back to the lower decks using the elevator.  
OA.1.4.4 Move Spent AUR to Storage: The spent AUR case will be moved into 
storage.  
OA.1.4.5 Verify Integrity of Other Missions: After the system has been fully 
retrograded the vessel’s ability to perform its other functions will be restored. Procedures 
designed to confirm the vessel’s successful retrograde will be conducted. 
2. EPF Class Vessel, LRHW AUR, Crane Launch 
This candidate system will launch the Army LRHW AUR from a cradle system that 
will be suspended from the boom crane. Unlike the LPD, the EPF cannot easily move a 
loaded M870 trailer from a storage location to the flight deck. Instead, the EPF will take 
advantage of its 27-ton crane that is located at the mouth of the mission bay, shown in 
Figure 17. The cradle will perform the functions of securing the AUR on the crane and 
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orienting the AUR in an appropriate configuration before launching. This cradle system is 
not part of any of the existing components of the candidate system and will have to be 
developed in a separate effort. The fact that this cradle and crane launching concept has 
not been used before means there is a significant amount of risk associated with the 
successful development of the cradle.  
After moving both the cradle and the AUR to the mission bay from storage, the 
AUR will be loaded into the cradle system and given its targeting information. The loaded 
system will be moved to the mouth of the mission bay where it will be hoisted by the crane. 
Once the missile system is in place on the crane the system will be ready to launch. 
After launching the missile, the spent AUR and cradle will be released from the 
crane at the mouth of the mission bay and moved back into the mission bay to be 
disassembled and either loaded with another fresh AUR or sent back to storage.  
 
Figure 17. Rendering of EPF/LRHW AUR concept. Adapted from Vavasseur 
(2020). 
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a. Candidate System 1 Sub-system and SV-5b 
A DoDAF SV-5b Operation Activity to Systems Traceability Matrix diagram for 
candidate system 2 is shown in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18. Candidate system 2 SV-5b 
In this SV-5b, the systems and sub-systems required for the launching of the LRHW 
AUR from the EPF crane are identified and linked to the operational activities that they 
perform. These systems include: 
1. EPF – see below for a full explanation. 
2. Crane – this is the crane that is present on the stern of the EPF outside of 















OA.2.1.1 CS2 Store Missiles X
OA.2.1.2 CS2 Store Cradle X
OA.2.1.3 CS2 Move Cradle to Mission Bay X
OA.2.1.4 CS2 Move Missiles to Mission Bay X
OA.2.2.1 CS2 Load Missile into Cradle X
OA.2.2.2 CS2 Hoist Cradle X
OA.2.2.3 CS2 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable X
OA.2.2.4 CS2 Launch Missile X
OA.2.3.1 CS2 Receive Notice to Start Mission X
OA.2.3.2 CS2 Acquire Mission Data Package X
OA.2.3.3 CS2 Acquire Launch Approval X
OA.2.4.1 CS2 Release Cradle X
OA.2.4.2 CS2 Breakdown Cradle X
OA.2.4.3 CS2 Move Cradle to Storage X
OA.2.4.4 CS2 Move Spent AUR to Storage X
OA.2.4.5 CS2 Verify Integrity of Other Missions X
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component cradle that secures the LRHW AUR and is hoisted by the crane 
will need to be designed, built, and tested.  
3. Mission Bay Lift – this is the native materiel lifting capability inside the 
mission bay of the EPF. This lifting capability will need to be able to lift 
the LRHW AUR and place it into the cradle. 
4. C2 – this is the command-and-control system that will be used to receive 
mission packages, launch authorizations, and transfer mission data to the 
LRHW AUR prior to launching. In the EPF this system will be the 
AFATDS that is included in the terrestrial LRHW system because the EPF 
lacks any native C2 capabilities for missile fire control. 
The system labeled “EPF” is intended to be an overarching group of capabilities 
that are provided by the host vessel. The sub-systems that are included in this category are: 
1. The munition storage system, to include meeting requirements outlined in 
OP-4.  
2. Cradle storage. 
3. A system that can safely move the LRHW AURs from storage to the 
mission bay. 
4. Vessel procedures and personnel are required to make statements about 
the state of the vessel, i.e., whether it is safe to launch the missile and 
whether the vessel has been appropriately retrograded and is ready to 
conduct its other missions. 
b. Operational Activities and EFFBD 
Figure 19 shows the enhanced functional flow block diagram for the candidate 
system comprised of the EPF and LRHW AUR using the EPF crane and a custom missile 
cradle as the launching platform. The EFFBD describes the operational activities, outputs, 
and triggers that are needed to conduct the successful launching of a single LRHW AUR 
from the EPF crane. This EFFBD does not consider the potential for a misfire requiring 
remediation or reloading the crane to launch additional missiles. 
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Figure 19. EFFBD for crane launch of LRHW AUR from an EPF 
OA.2.1.0 Store Missile System: The missile system must be safely stored on the 
EPF. The EPF does not natively have a location on the ship that is designed to hold.  
OA.2. 1.1 Store Missiles: The missiles will be stored as AURs. The total number 
of missiles that can be stored for use will depend on the exact dimensions of the missiles, 
the exact dimensions of the storage space, and the number of other munitions that will need 
to be removed to accommodate the storage of the AURs. 
OA.2. 1.2 Store Cradle: The cradle will be stored in an accessible location inside 
the EPF. The size and weight of the cradle are not predicted to be a significant burden to 
move throughout the storage compartments and mission bay of the EPF. 
OA.2.1.3 Move Cradle to Mission Bay:  The cradle will be moved to the mission 
bay using onboard forklifts or overhead crane systems. 
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OA.2.1.4 Move Missiles to Mission Bay:  The AURs will be removed from their 
storage location and moved into the mission bay the same way as the cradle. 
OA.2.2.0 Prepare Missile for Launch: After the launcher and missile are 
collocated, they must be configured to prepare for launch. 
OA.2.2.1 Load Missile into Cradle: The AUR or AURs in the mission bay will 
be loaded into the cradle system. The mechanism used to accomplish this step could either 
be some sort of crane or lift mechanism that is already in place in the mission bay. The 
design of the cradle system will contribute greatly to the operation of loading the AUR into 
the cradle. 
OA.2.2.2 Hoist Cradle: Once the cradle has been loaded with the AUR and the 
targeting information has been provided to the missiles, the ready-to-launch system will be 
transported to the mouth of the mission bay using the forklift or equivalent mechanism 
provided by the native capabilities of the EPF. The cradle will be connected to the crane 
and hoisted into position. 
OA.2.3.0 Launch Missiles: The steps that are required to start the launching 
process and launch the missile at the target. 
OA.2.3.1 Receive Notice to Start Mission: The portion of the command-and-
control center that is responsible for receiving orders to conduct offensive strikes will 
initiate the launch process by receiving the orders to launch the missile. The personnel who 
are responsible for receiving and disseminating the orders will notify the chain of command 
that a hypersonic missile launch is being. 
OA.2.3.2 Acquire Mission Data Package: The targeting information for the 
hypersonic missile strike will be provided from a system external to the EPF. There are 
currently no systems onboard the EPF that can provide the command and control needed 
to target and launch the LRHW AUR. This means that the AFATDS that is currently used 
on the terrestrial LRHW system will likely be needed to be available on the EPF to provide 
command and control. Therefore, the AFATDS’s storage, transportation, setup, and use 
will need to be accounted for in the system.  
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OA.2.3.3 Acquire Launch Approval: In addition to the mission data package, the 
command approval to launch the LRHW will also be acquired. 
OA.2.3.4 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable: After the system has been 
hoisted by the crane, an assessment of the firing environment will be made. This includes 
ensuring the AUR is secured in the cradle, oriented correctly, and final checks on the 
readiness of the system and safety considerations regarding the personnel and equipment 
on or near the mission bay and upper flight deck.  
OA.2.3.5 Launch Missile: After the firing environment has been determined to be 
acceptable the missiles will be launched at their target. 
OA.2.4.0 Retrograde Missile Launcher: After the missile launch has occurred 
additional steps will be taken to recover the spent launcher and prepare for the vessel to 
conduct its other missions. 
OA.2.4.1 Release Cradle: After the missile has been successfully launched, the 
cradle and spent AUR will be returned to the mouth of the mission bay and moved into the 
mission bay with the forklift or equivalent mechanism. 
OA.2.4.2 Breakdown Cradle: Once the system is back in the mission bay, the 
cradle will be disassembled by removing the AUR using the same lift system that was used 
to put the AUR into the cradle. 
OA.2.4.3 Move Cradle to Storage: The cradle will be assessed, prepared for 
storage, and moved back to storage.  
OA.2.4.4 Move Spent AUR to Storage: The spent AUR case will be moved into 
storage.  
OA.2.4.5 Verify Integrity of Other Missions: After the system has been fully 
retrograded the vessel’s ability to perform its other functions will be restored. 
3. LCS Class Vessel, LRHW AUR, Trailer Launch 
The greatest limiting factor for the LCS to be able to accommodate the launch of 
the LRHW is the fact that the elevator connecting the bulk of the storage area available in 
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the LCS to the hangar and flight deck is not large enough to transport either the M870 
trailer or individual LRHW AURs. This means that in order to launch LRHW AURs, the 
hangar space of the LCS will need to be reserved for the storage, arming, movement, and 
recovery of the LRHW system being used. The flight deck will still be able to be land 
helicopters, but there will be no hangar facilities available for helicopter storage or service. 
The limited space in the hangar means that the AURs will likely need to be stored directly 
on the M870 trailers because there will not be enough space for separate storage for the 
AURs, M870s, AFATDS, and a mechanism for loading the AURs onto the M870s. 
The launching of the LRHW from the LCS will be essentially identical to the 
launching of the LRHW from the LPD: the M870 trailer equipped with LRHW AURs will 
be prepared with the mission data package in the hangar space, towed onto the flight deck, 
and launched directly from the M870 trailer. 
a. Candidate System 1 Sub-system and SV-5b 
A DoDAF SV-5b Operation Activity to Systems Traceability Matrix diagram for 
candidate system 3 is shown in Figure 20.  
 












OA.3.1.1 CS3 Store Missiles X
OA.3.1.2 CS3 Store Launcher X
OA.3.2.1 CS3 Move System to Flight Deck X
OA.3.2.2 CS3 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable X
OA.3.2.3 CS3 Launch Missile X
OA.3.3.1 CS3 Receive Notice to Start Mission X
OA.3.3.2 CS3 Acquire Mission Data Package X
OA.3.3.3 CS3 Acquire Launch Approval X
OA.3.4.1 CS3 Move Spent System to Hangar X
OA.3.4.2 CS3 Verify Integrity of Other Missions X
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In this SV-5b, the systems and sub-systems required for the launching of the LRHW 
AUR from the LCS flight deck are identified and linked to the operational activities that 
they perform. These systems include: 
1. LCS – see below for a full explanation. 
2. Trailer – this is the M870 trailer that the LRHW AURs will be launched 
from 
3. Tractor – this is the mechanism by which the trailer will be conveyed. It 
will either be a native LCS capability or the M983A4 that is currently 
included in the terrestrial LRHW system. 
4. C2 – this is the command-and-control system that will be used to receive 
mission packages, launch authorizations, and transfer mission data to the 
LRHW AUR prior to launching. In the LCS this system will likely be the 
AFATDS that is included in the terrestrial LRHW system unless a suitable 
alternative is natively available on board the LCS. 
The system labeled “LCS” is intended to be an overarching group of capabilities 
that are provided by the host vessel. The sub-systems that are included in this category are: 
 
1. The munition storage system, to include meeting requirements outlined in 
OP-4. It is unclear whether the requirements outlined in OP-4 will be able 
to be met with the need to store LRHW AURs inside the LCS hangar. 
2. Vessel procedures and personnel are required to make statements about 
the state of the vessel, i.e., whether it is safe to launch the missile and 
whether the vessel has been appropriately retrograded and is ready to 
conduct its other missions. 
b. Operational Activities and EFFBD 
Figure 21 shows the EFFBD for the candidate system comprised of the LCS and 
LRHW using the LCS flight deck and M870 trailer as the launching platform. The EFFBD 
describes the operational activities, outputs, and triggers that are needed to conduct the 
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successful launching of a single load of LRHW AURs from the M870 trailer. This EFFBD 
does not consider the potential for a misfire requiring remediation or reloading the trailer 
to launch additional missiles. 
 
Figure 21. EFFBD for crane launch of LRHW AUR from an EPF 
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OA.3.1.0 Store Missile System: The missile system must be safely stored on the 
LCS. As described earlier, the LCS has no mechanism that can physically transport M870 
trailers or LRHW AURs from the lower mission bay and cargo storage to the hangar and 
subsequently the flight deck. This means that the hangar will need to be converted into a 
space to store and service the LRHW system, including the M870 trailer, the AURs, the 
AFATDS, and the mechanism that will be used to move the M870 trailer to and from the 
flight deck.  
OA.3.1.1 Store Missiles: The missiles will be stored as AURs preloaded onto the 
M870 trailer. 
OA.3.1.2 Store Launcher: The M870 trailer will be stored in the hangar with 
AURs already loaded onto it. 
OA.3.2.0 Prepare Missile for Launch: After the mission has been started, the 
mission package data will be uploaded to the LRHW system and the trailer will be moved 
to the flight deck.  
OA.3.2.1 Load Missile into Cradle: Once the targeting information has been 
provided to the missiles, the ready-to-launch system will be transported to the flight deck. 
The entire process of transportation is not fully understood, but the most desirable method 
would be to use a tractor that is currently used on the LCS to move aircraft in and out of 
the mission bay. If this tractor is not capable of moving the loaded M870, then another 
vehicle will need to be added to the system to accomplish this function. 
In addition to the M870 trailer that will need to move onto the flight deck, a blast 
shield will need to be placed on the flight deck to protect the surface from the hot exhaust 
gases of the LRHW launching. This blast shield is not a part of the LHRW system and has 
not yet been designed. 
OA.3.3.0 Launch Missiles: The steps that are required to start the launching 
process and launch the missile at the target. 
OA.3.3.1 Receive Notice to Start Mission: The portion of the command-and-
control center that is responsible for receiving orders to conduct offensive strikes will 
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initiate the launch process by receiving the orders to launch the missile. The personnel who 
are responsible for receiving and disseminating the orders will notify the chain of command 
that a hypersonic missile launch is being. 
OA.3.3.2 Acquire Mission Data Package: The targeting information for the 
hypersonic missile strike will be provided from a system external to the LCS. There are 
currently no systems onboard the LCS that can provide the command and control needed 
to target and launch the LRHW AUR. This means that the AFATDS that is currently used 
on the terrestrial LRHW system will likely be needed to be available on the LCS to provide 
command and control. Therefore, the AFATDS’s storage, transportation, setup, and use 
will need to be accounted for in the system.  
OA.3.3.3 Acquire Launch Approval: In addition to the mission data package, the 
command approval to launch the LRHW will also be acquired. 
OA.3.3.4 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable: After the system is in place 
on the flight deck an assessment of the firing environment will be made. This includes final 
checks on the readiness of the system and safety considerations regarding the personnel 
and equipment on or near the flight deck.  
OA.3.3.5 Launch Missile: After the firing environment has been determined to be 
acceptable the missiles will be launched at their target. This function is entirely determined 
by the missile launching process determined by the LHRW system. 
OA.3.4.0 Retrograde Missile Launcher: After the missile launch has occurred 
additional steps will be taken to recover the spent launcher and prepare for the vessel to 
conduct its other missions. 
OA.3.4.1 Move Spent System to Hangar: After the missile is launched from the 
flight deck, the spent system will be transported back into the hangar. The lack of additional 
storage for the spent AURs in the hangar means that it is likely the spent AURs will remain 
loaded on the M870 until the whole system is removed at port. 
OA.3.4.2 Verify Integrity of Other Missions: After the system has been fully 
retrograded the vessel’s ability to perform its other functions will be restored. 
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V. SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
The system analysis was conducted using the Multi-Attribute Value Theory. This 
approach allowed the RIHMC Capstone Team to assess all attributes with a combination 
of stakeholder preferences over conflicting attributes to discover alternatives with the 
highest value. (Buede 2016, 400) The team started by determining the multiple attributes 
that would be used for measurement. Only the genuine distinctions between alternatives 
should be used to make decisions. (Fabrycky 2011) Focusing on the differences between 
our alternatives provided attributes that would offer the strongest justification during our 
decision evaluation. To appropriately measure three independent criteria within an additive 
model we determined a swing weight using the Parnell method. Creating a swing weight 
for each attribute allows for the individual values to be measured together although they 
do not have similar units. These swing weights were then used to create the normalized 
weight for each attribute. This step is important as it allows specific measures to have more 
weight on the value of an alternative depending on the preference of our stakeholders. The 
last step was evaluating the value functions with each swing weight.  
A. DEFINING ATTRIBUTES AND DELINEATE VALUE FUNCTION 
1. Number of AURs Stored 
Table 6 shows a summary of the diverse types of storage space available for the 
three types of vessels considered for the candidate systems. The physical space available 
in each of these types of storage was considered along with the dimensions of the LRHW 
AURs and other details of the vessels to determine the maximum number of AURs each 
candidate system could hold. It is assumed that the AURs can be stacked two high with 
some sort of rack or spacing mechanism that would be available from the LRHW program 
office. The footprint of an AUR is assumed to be 13 meters long and 2 meters wide. 
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Table 6. Storage spaces for each vessel type 
 
 
a. LPD Storage  
The LPD has the most storage space available for the M870 trailer system and is 
the only ship with a dedicated magazine that will meet all the munition requirements set 
forth by the OP-4. The LPD concept uses a single M870 trailer that is loaded with separate 
AURs, so there only needs to be space for a single M870 reserved. With a beam of 32 
meters, the LPD magazine would also hold the AURs with their long dimension across the 
vessel. If one-half of the 708 m2 magazine is reserved for LRHW AURs, this means that 
the AURs can be stored two wide, five deep, and two high for a total of 20 AURs available 
onboard a single LPD. If instead one-quarter of the magazine is reserved for LRHW AURs, 
a total of ten AURs would be available. 
The amphibious assault mission of the LPD means that every component of the 
hypersonic missile launching system that needs to be added to the LPD must correspond 
to the removal of some component of the amphibious assault package. The impact of the 
single M870 trailer and AFATDS system in the vehicle storage is minimal to the 
amphibious assault mission because only a single trailer must be accounted for. The storage 
of the AURs in the magazine has a much bigger impact – in the example given one half of 
the storage that was available to the amphibious force is now reserved by the AURs. 
Depending on the mission requirements for the hypersonic missile capability, carrying 
fewer AURs to maximize space for ammunition for the amphibious force may be 
necessary. The ten AUR option would likely be preferable in order to achieve the lowest 
impact on the other missions of the LPD. 
EPF LCS LPD
Cargo Space 1800 m2 1410 m2 2323 m2
Mission Bay/Hangar Space N/A 351 m2 640 m2
Magazine Space N/A N/A 708 m3
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b. EPF Storage 
The EPF’s cargo space of 1,800 m2 represents the usage of the entire hold of the 
EPF for the mission of launching LRHW missiles. If half of the hold is reserved for 
maneuvering the AURs into firing position, maneuvering spent AURs after they come off 
the crane, storing the AFATDS, storing the cradle system, and storing other equipment that 
will be used to move AURs, 900 m2 remains to be filled with AURs.  
The beam of the EPF is 28.5 meters which means that two AURs can likely fit 
across the width of the cargo space. To achieve a balanced payload, half of the cargo hold 
would be filled two AURs across. This means that the 900 m2 area can hold 31.5 meters 
deep worth of AURs. At 2 meters deep, this is enough for the footprint of 30 AURs. When 
the AURs are stacked 2 high, this means there is room for 60 AURs onboard a single EPF. 
The practicality of this number of AURs onboard the EPF is questionable. There is 
no good estimate for the weight of the AUR, so 60 AURs may be too heavy for the EPF to 
hold. The danger associated with holding this amount of ordnance, especially in a generic 
cargo hold and not a magazine, may introduce too much risk to the operation of the ship. 
It is also unlikely that the mission this EPF launching system would fill would require 60 
LRHW AURs to complete. Finally, at an estimated cost of between $30 and $50 million 
each, a load of 60 AURs represents a $2 to $3 billion cost to carry this many AURs.  
c. LCS Storage 
The LCS’s cargo space of 1,410 m2 is inaccessible for use as storage for M870 
trailers or LRHW AURs because the elevator connected the storage space to the hangar 
and flight deck cannot accommodate the 40-foot length of each component. This means 
that the entire LRHW system used for this capability will need to be permanently stored in 
the hangar location. 
The beam of the LCS is 32 meters, which means that the 351 m2 is only 11 meters 
deep. The M870 trailer is 12.8 meters long by 2.4 meters wide and would need to be stored 
with its long dimension across the beam of the LCS. Two M870 trailers would take up an 
area approximately 15 meters wide by 6 meters deep in the LCS hangar. The remainder of 
the hangar would be reserved for maneuvering the trailers, the AFATDS, and the tractor 
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system required to move the trailers. Each M870 trailer would have two AURs loaded on 
them as described earlier in the candidate system 3 section. This means that a total of four 
LRHW AURs are available onboard a single LCS. 
This system requires the entire hangar of the LCS to be reserved for the M870 
trailers and AURs. The flight deck will still be able to land and launch helicopters when 
the LRHW is not being fired, but there will no longer be a space to service aircraft on the 
LCS. 
d. Number of AURs Stored Rating Curve 
Figure 22 shows the linear piece-wise rating curve developed for the number of 
AURs stored attribute.  
 
Figure 22. Linear piece-wise rating curve for number of AURs stored 
attribute. 
The rating starts at 0 for no missile storage because the system would not be 
operational without AUR storage. The curve starts at a rating of 30 for a single AUR stored 
and increases to a rating of 100 linearly until 12 AURs are stored.  
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The literature review section describes the manner in which TLAM cruise missiles 
must be launched in salvos as large as 16 missiles to defeat a target with active defense. 
Due to its exceptional speed, maneuverability, and low flight path, a single hypersonic 
glide body missile is likely to be able to overcome an active defensive system that could 
defeat even a salvo attack of TLAMs. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer is equipped with 
96 TLAMs, or six salvo attacks of 16 missiles each. This means that a vessel equipped with 
12 hypersonic missiles can attack as many actively defended targets as two Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers firing 16-missile salvos. 12 AURs was chosen as the highest rating for this 
attribute because it represents the offensive equivalent of two entire vessels in the scenario 
where an actively defended target is being attacked. While additional hypersonic AURs on 
board a vessel does represent the ability to attack more targets, there are other 
considerations, such as cost or effect on other vessel missions, that prevent additional 
AURs beyond 12 from increasing the rating of this attribute. Table 7 summarizes the 
number of AURs that each candidate system can store. 
Table 7. Results of # of AURs stored attribute 
2. Time to Execute Launch
The time to execute launch attribute was calculated using the discrete event 
simulation tool COREsim. The EFFBDs presented in the candidate system section were 
used to simulate the estimated time it would take for each of the candidate systems to start 
from a fully stowed configuration and complete the activities required to launch the 
hypersonic missile. Normal distributions were used for each activity and each simulation 
was run 30 times. Mean values and 95% confidence intervals are reported for each 
candidate system. Assumptions regarding the duration and distribution time that each 
activity would require were made, and while the assumptions may not be absolutely 
accurate, they are consistent across the three candidate systems. This means that the final 
Measure CS1 - LPD CS2 - EPF CS3 - LCS
# of AURs Stored 10 20 4
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values determined for the time to execute a launch from each candidate system may be 
unrealistic, but a comparison of the relative times required for each candidate system is 
likely to be useful in rating the systems for further analysis. 
a. LPD Time to Execute Launch
Table 8 shows the durations and standard deviations used for the simulation of 
candidate system 1. 
Table 8. Candidate system 1 LPD activity timing 
The simulation resulted in a mean execution time of 53.9 minutes with a 95% 
confidence interval from 53.2 minutes to 54.7 minutes. 
b. EPF Time to Execute Launch
Table 9 shows the duration and standard deviations used for the simulation of 
candidate system 2. 
Number Operational Activity Time, min SD, min
OA.1.1.1 CS1 Store Missiles 0 0
OA.1.1.2 CS1 Store Launcher 0 0
OA.1.1.3 CS1 Move Launcher to Mission Bay 10 1
OA.1.1.4 CS1 Move Missiles to Mission Bay 10 1
OA.1.2.1 CS1 Load Missile into Launching System 10 1
OA.1.2.2 CS1 Move System to Flight Deck 2 0.5
OA.1.3.1 CS1 Receive Notice to Start Mission 0 0
OA.1.3.2 CS1 Acquire Mission Data Package 1 0.25
OA.1.3.3 CS1 Acquire Launch Approval 1 0.25
OA.1.3.4 CS1 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable 3 0.5
OA.1.3.5 CS1 Launch Missile 1 0.25
OA.1.4.1 CS1 Move Spent System to Mission Bay 2 0.5
OA.1.4.2 CS1 Breakdown Missile Launcher 5 1
OA.1.4.3 CS1 Move Launcher to Storage 10 1
OA.1.4.4 CS1 Move Spent AUR to Storage 10 1
OA.1.4.5 CS1 Verify Integrity of Other Missions 10 1
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Table 9. Candidate system 2 EPF activity timing 
The simulation resulted in a mean execution time of 49.9 minutes with a 95% 
confidence interval from 49.3 minutes to 50.5 minutes. 
c. LCS Time to Execute Launch
Table 10 shows the duration and standard deviations used for the simulation of 
candidate system 2. 
Number Operational Activity Time, min SD, min
OA.2.1.1 CS2 Store Missiles 0 0
OA.2.1.2 CS2 Store Cradle 0 0
OA.2.1.3 CS2 Move Cradle to Mission Bay 5 1
OA.2.1.4 CS2 Move Missiles to Mission Bay 5 1
OA.2.2.1 CS2 Load Missile into Cradle 10 1
OA.2.2.2 CS2 Hoist Cradle 5 1
OA.2.2.3 CS2 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable 2 0.5
OA.2.2.4 CS2 Launch Missile 1 0.25
OA.2.3.1 CS2 Receive Notice to Start Mission 0 0
OA.2.3.2 CS2 Acquire Mission Data Package 1 0.25
OA.2.3.3 CS2 Acquire Launch Approval 1 0.25
OA.2.4.1 CS2 Release Cradle 2 0.5
OA.2.4.2 CS2 Breakdown Cradle 5 1
OA.2.4.3 CS2 Move Cradle to Storage 5 1
OA.2.4.4 CS2 Move Spent AUR to Storage 5 1
OA.2.4.5 CS2 Verify Integrity of Other Missions 5 1
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Table 10. Candidate system 3 LCS activity timing 
The simulation resulted in a mean execution time of 21.9 minutes with a 95% 
confidence interval from 20.9 minutes to 22.9 minutes. 
d. Time to Execute Launch Rating Curve
Figure 23 shows the linear piece-wise rating curve developed for the time to execute 
launch attribute. 
Number Operational Activity Time, min SD, min
OA.3.1.1 CS3 Store Missiles 0 0
OA.3.1.2 CS3 Store Launcher 0 0
OA.3.2.1 CS3 Move System to Flight Deck 5 1
OA.3.2.2 CS3 Ensure Firing Environment is Acceptable 5 1
OA.3.2.3 CS3 Launch Missile 1 0.25
OA.3.3.1 CS3 Receive Notice to Start Mission 0 0
OA.3.3.2 CS3 Acquire Mission Data Package 1 0.25
OA.3.3.3 CS3 Acquire Launch Approval 1 0.25
OA.3.4.1 CS3 Move Spent System to Hangar 5 1
OA.3.4.2 CS3 Verify Integrity of Other Missions 5 1
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Figure 23. Linear piece-wise rating curve for time to execute launch attribute 
The piece-wise linear rating curve for the time to launch attribute was constructed 
to give a full rating if the hypersonic missile can be launched in 30 minutes or less. The 
rating decreases to 50 as the launch takes up to an hour. This relatively high rating floor 
represents the fact that a launch from this system will likely be planned well ahead of 
execution rather than be needed immediately. Table 11 summarizes the time it takes each 
candidate system to launch a missile with a 95% confidence interval. 
Table 11. Results of time to execute launch attribute 
 
 
3. Time to Implement 
The time to implement attribute was determined using information available from 
the LRHW and VPM programs. The LRHW is currently scheduled for an FY23 IOC while 
the VPM is currently scheduled for an FY28 IOC. This means that the earliest possible 
time a vessel could be equipped with an LRHW or LRHW AUR is 24 months from July 
Measure CS1 - LPD CS2 - EPF CS3 - LCS
Time to Execute, minutes 53.9 ± 0.7 49.9 ± 0.6 21.9 ± 1.0
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2021. If a vessel is not equipped with a hypersonic capability by FY28, it is likely that the 
capability that will be available to the fleet through the use of the VPM will surpass the 
candidate systems presented here, rendering the implementation of the candidate system 
obsolete. 
a. LPD Time to Implement 
The proposed design of candidate system 1 does not require any significant 
modification of the LPD and so the implementation of candidate system 1 is entirely reliant 
on the availability of the LRHW system. Assuming that the planning for candidate system 
1 can begin immediately, it can be assumed that once the LRHW systems are available 
there will be very little delay in their integration onto the LPD. Therefore, the predicted 
time to implement candidate system 1 is 24 months. 
b. EPF Time to Implement 
The crane launching concept used in candidate system 2 necessitates the use of a 
cradle system to secure the LRHW AUR in place on the crane before firing. This concept 
of launching missiles from a naval vessel is not currently implemented and the cradle 
system does not exist. An engineering design and manufacturing team at the U.S. Army 
Combat Capabilities Development Command Chemical Biological Center (DEVCOM 
CBC) was asked to provide an estimate for the design, build, and test of the crane system 
described in candidate system 2. The engineering team determined that an estimated 18 
months would be needed to develop, build, and test the cradle system after the final 
configuration of the LRHW AURs was known and available to be worked with. This means 
that the final estimate for the implementation of candidate system 2 is 18 months after the 
delivery of the LRHW, or 42 months from July 2021. 
c. LCS Time to Implement 
The proposed design of candidate system 3 aboard the LCS utilizes identical 
LRHW system hardware as the candidate system 1 design. Therefore, the 24-month time 
to implement the LRHW system aboard the LCS is identical to the time to implement 
aboard the LPD. 
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d. Time to Implement Rating Curve 
Figure 24 shows the linear piece-wise rating curve developed for the time to 
implement attribute. 
 
Figure 24. Linear piece-wise rating curve for time to implement attribute 
The piece-wise linear rating curve for the time to implement attribute was 
constructed to give a full rating if the hypersonic missile system can be implemented 
aboard the vessel in 24 months or less. The rating decreases to 0 as the time to implement 
reaches 60 months. This rating floor of 0 represents the fact that other systems to launch 
hypersonic missiles from naval will be available in this time frame, and likely be more 
intentionally designed for their applications to provide superior capability to the candidate 
systems described here. Table 12 summarizes the time it will take for each candidate 
system to be implemented. 
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Table 12. Results of time to implement attribute 
 
 
B. ASSESSING WEIGHTS 
Once the three criteria were defined a swing weight was extracted using the Parnell 
Method (Parnell 2016). The swing weight was determined by the variation in each attribute 
as well as the level of importance each attribute has to the alternative solution. The 
assignment of swing weights did require a level of judgment based on stakeholder’s needs 
and preferences. We assigned the original stakeholder concern for rapid implementation 
100 as the main measure of performance for this project is to provide rapid hypersonic 
missile launching capability to the fleet. We then assessed the remaining differences 
between our alternatives and how their variation and importance impacted the needs of our 
stakeholders, leaving missile volume with 32 swing weight and time to execute functions 
with 10. These swing weights provide a normalized weight for the three independent 
criteria to be measured together although their measurements and impact may be different. 
The swing weight benefits the analysis by allowing a measure that is critical to the decision 
problem to be given more weight than a measure that is less critical. Table 13 is the 
completed swing weight matrix, with the swing weight shown in bold for each attribute. 
Measure CS1 - LPD CS2 - EPF CS3 - LCS
Time of Implementation, months 24 42 24
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Table 13. Swing weight matrix 
 
 
C. SCORING ALTERNATIVES 
An additive model calculation, that includes the value functions and normalized 
weights, was used to provide a quantitative score for each alternative. The RIHMC Team 
utilized these scores to accomplish further analysis and aid in decision-making. We utilized 
the Ideal Range Method which establishes a best and worst range creating scoring 
measurements that apply more directly to the decision evaluation. The main purpose of 
utilizing this method is that it produces a flexible analysis that would allow for future 
alternatives to be considered. The final decision matrix can be seen in Table 14. 
Table 14. Final scores for candidate systems. 
 













































































Missile Storage, # AURs 32 0.23 87 19.7 100 22.5 49 11.1
Time of Implementation, months 100 0.70 100 70.4 50 35.2 100 70.4
Time to Execute, minutes 10 0.07 60 4.2 67 4.7 100 7.0
Total value 94.3 62.5 88.5
CS1 - LPD CS2 - EPF CS3 - LCS
66 
D. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
We scored all three alternatives using value measurements to give our stakeholders a value 
that represented the performance in fulfilling each criterion. We used Microsoft Excel to 
create a model that would calculate the alternatives score based on each alternatives value 
function and each attributes swing weights. Candidate system 1 scored highest when 
evaluated based on all three attributes.  
1. Sensitivity Analysis  
We executed a sensitivity analysis on our normalized weights to assess the validity 
of our results. The purpose of a sensitivity analysis is to determine how possible changes 
in parameter values affect model outputs (Rappaport 2021). Since our scores are a 
calculation of swing weight and value function for each candidate system, we needed to 
determine what changes in the swing weights would change the results of our scores. 
Conducting a sensitivity analysis also helps identify the relationship between independent 
parameters on dependent parameters.  
We determined the sensitivity of each swing weight by adjusting each attribute to 
either zero or one then log the difference in scoring for each attribute. After each adjusted 
score was calculated, we plot the existing and adjusted scores to compare the differences.  
The sensitivity analysis performed on the attribute of Number of AURs, shown in 
Figure 25, reveals that the weight of this attribute would need to be raised significantly 
from 0.23 to 0.8 for the threshold to flip the decision scoring the EPF higher than the LPD. 
Another observation from the sensitivity analysis shows that the normalized weight of this 
attribute would need to decrease below 0.1 to flip the decision point that would cause the 
LCS to score higher than the LPD. Both of these results show that the result from this 
analysis is not sensitive to a moderate change in the weight assigned to Number of AURs. 
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Figure 25. Candidate system scores by varied Number of AURs weight 
The sensitivity analysis performed, shown in Figure 26, on the attribute Time to 
Implement illustrates that the weight for both LPD and LCS are identical. This tells 
decision makers that no matter what the change is in weight both alternatives will score the 
same. The most important observation from the sensitivity analysis shows that the 
normalized weight of this attribute would need to decrease by 80 percent for the decision 
to flip causing the EPF to score higher. 
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Figure 26. Candidate system scores by varied Time to Implement weight 
The third sensitivity analysis performed was on the attribute Time to Execute, 
shown in Figure 27. This analysis identified that there would need to be a significant change 
in weight for the threshold to cause the EPF to score higher than the LPD, however, not 
much change would be necessary for LCS to score higher compared to the LPD alternative.  
 
Figure 27. Candidate system scores by varied Time to Execute weight 
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While each attribute’s sensitivity analysis identifies the point at which the decision 
would flip from one alternative to another the analysis also helps decision makers identify 
which parameter values have a substantial influence on metrics and therefore should be 
carefully modeled (Law 2014). 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The RIHMC Capstone Team was tasked to examine how to integrate a hypersonic 
glide body system and integrate it into a U.S. Navy surface vessel. This Capstone project 
describes the possible integration of the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) 
system into three types of vessels considered as candidate systems: the San Antonio-class 
LPD, the Spearhead-class EPF, and the Independence-class LCS. A systems engineering 
approach was used to collect concerns, identify requirements, derive MOEs and MOPs, 
and perform a functional analysis to ultimately describe how each of the candidate systems 
would be implemented on board each vessel. The Multi-Attribute Value theory was used 
in conjunction with the Parnell method to measure three independent criteria and apply 
swing weights for each criteria based to allow the disparate attributes of the systems to be 
normalized into a single measurement. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
(1) Number of AURs Stored 
One of the research objectives of this study was to examine if a hypersonic missile 
system could be developed that could safely, effectively, and efficiently store, transport, 
and launch hypersonic missiles from existing Navy platforms. After evaluating all 
candidate system, we determined that the LPD has the most storage space available for the 
required components of the LRHW and is the only candidate ship with a dedicated 
magazine that will meet all the munition requirements set forth by the Navy’s Ammunition 
and Explosives Safety Afloat Manual, the OP-4. In terms of mission bay or hangar space 
availability, the LPD is the best candidate vessel to be able to safely carry the AURs and 
not compromise the vessel’s hangar space and its ability to service aircraft. 
(2) Time to Execute Launch 
Another research objective was to determine which design considerations of the 
alternative launching system are the most critical to the successful implementation of this 
offensive strike capability. During offensive maritime operations, time to execute launch 
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is a critical requirement for mission success. The time to execute obtained averaged 53.9 
minutes for the LPD, 49.9 minutes for the EPF, and 21.9 minutes for the LCS. The LCS 
vessel was modeled as the candidate system with the fastest time to execute launch 
particularly due the fact that the AURs and the M870 trailer will have to be permanently 
stored in the hangar adjacent to the flight deck due to the inability to move LRHW AURs 
via the hangar elevator. 
(3) Time to Implement 
A third research objective was to determine the time of implementation of candidate 
the hypersonic missile system into the Fleet. In order to keep up strategically with Chinese 
and Russian hypersonic offensive capabilities, the Navy has proposed to implement a 
hypersonic missile weapon system to the surface Fleet by FY 2025. We determined 24 
months for time of implementation for the LPD, 42 months for the EPF and 24 months for 
the LCS. The LPD and LCS have identical time to implement because they both take 
advantage of the M870 trailer for launching hypersonic missiles and will not require 
significant deviation from the standard operation of the LRHW system. The EPF has a 
longer time to implement because it will require significant engineering and manufacturing 
efforts to develop the crane launching cradle and method. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
After performing the swing weights analysis of all three attributes, candidate 
system 1, the LPD, scored highest when evaluated based on all three attributes. Close 
behind was candidate system 3, LCS, while candidate system 2, EPF, lagged behind 
considerably. We recommend candidate system 1, the San Antonio-class LPD launching 
the LRHW from its flight deck, be considered as a possible ship platform for a future 
hypersonic glide body weapon system.  
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C. FUTURE WORK 
(1) LRHW AUR Safety Considerations 
The requirements for magazines that must hold missiles with rocket motors can be 
found in NAVSEA OP 4, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Afloat. Each of the candidate 
systems describes storing the LRHW AURs somewhere onboard the vessels – in an 
ammunition magazine on the LPD, in the cargo hold on the EPF, and in the hangar on the 
LCS. It is unlikely that all of these storage locations will meet the requirements set forth in 
OP 4 and further analysis of the requirements to modify each of these spaces or to develop 
procedures that are acceptable to be able to store the AURs in these spaces. This represents 
a significant risk to the implementation of the LRHW as a rapid solution for hypersonic 
missile capability. 
One solution that was presented by the Sponsor was to permanently store the 
LRHW system including the AURs and AFATDS on the flight deck of the various vessels. 
For example, Figure 28 shows highlights an area of the EPF deck that could be used to 
permanently store an LRHW trailer with two AURs loaded onto it.  
 
Figure 28. Potential on deck storage on the Spearhead-class EPF. Source: 
Vavasseur (2020). 
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The team believes that hypersonic weapons could be used in this deck-stored 
configuration, however more research into the ability of the LRHW to remain reliable after 
being stored for extended periods of time in an unprotected maritime environment may be 
necessary. Additionally, it is unlikely that weather or sea states will be such that the systems 
can be truly permanently stored on the open flight deck. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the requirements for even temporary storage in the portions of the vessels that 
will be unprotected from the elements. 
(2) Feasibility of EPF Offensive Launches 
The Spearhead-class EPF is a United States Naval Ship (USNS) vessel, which 
means that it is non-commissioned and serviced by a civilian crew. The ability to perform 
offensive missile strikes from a non-commissioned vessel represents a significant risk to 
the operation of the candidate system. Concerns 1.1 Personnel Required for Missile Launch 
and 1.2 Personnel Required to Authorize Launch reflect the need for the appropriate 
personnel and permissions to be available on the vessel that is performing the offensive 
launch. In the case of the EPF, it may be possible for a small contingent of enlisted sailors 
to be onboard the vessel to perform the missile launch. If the candidate system based on 
the EPF is to be pursued, additional work must be performed to define how the appropriate 
personnel and permissions will be put in place. 
(3) Understanding LPD Trade-offs 
The analysis of the number of AURs that can be carried on the LPD described a 
scenario where storage for vehicles that were part of the amphibious assault force in the 
vehicle storage locations on board the LPD would be displaced by the M870 trailer required 
to launch the LRHW missiles. It also described displacing munitions for the amphibious 
assault force in the magazine storage to store LRHW AURs. The displacement of 
equipment required for other missions to be conducted on board is the basis of Concern 1.3 
Vessel Mission and the impact of adding a hypersonic missile capability on the amphibious 
assault mission must be understood. It is recommended that experts on the operation of the 
LPD and on the planning and execution of amphibious assault missions be consulted to 
determine how best to modify the LPD’s cargo to meet both missions. 
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(4) Understanding LCS Hanger Trade-offs 
Similar to the concern described previously for the LPD, the candidate system that 
uses the LCS would prevent the hangar space from being used on the LCS from being used 
to house and service helicopters. The flight deck will still be available for helicopters to 
operate from unless the LRHW is being prepared to fire. The implications to the 
capabilities of the LCS not being able to use its hangar needs to be understood to address 
Concern 1.3 Vessel Mission. 
(5) Exploring Box Launchers 
In Appendix A, the Sponsor describes how box launchers for cruise missiles or 
defensive missiles are currently employed throughout the fleet. The advantages described 
include superior gas management systems and offensive strikes capability that is available 
in a fraction of the time that the candidate systems described in this paper require. While 
there are currently many weapons systems that are contained in box launchers, none of 
them approach the size of the LRHW. For example, the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) 
described by the sponsor is 13 feet long, approximately one third the size of the LRHW 
AUR. Development of a box launcher that would accommodate the LRHW missile in an 
LRHW AUR-like box launcher represents a significant deviation from the size and 
configuration of currently deployed box launchers. Missile launching characteristics of the 
larger LRHW may also preclude the use of launchers that do not start in a vertical or close 
to vertical configuration. 
Any development of box launching systems for hypersonic glide body equipped 
missiles that would be a direct replacement for currently deployed box launching systems 
on vessels like the Independence-class LCS would require a significant amount of time. 
This study did not consider their employment because of the significant difference between 
the date of availability of the LRHW fired from the M870 trailer compared to the LRHW 
missile being launched from a box launcher. 
Further development of a C-HGB-equipped missile that can be loaded in the VPM 
by the Navy will likely result in a hypersonic glide body missile capability in a smaller 
missile form factor. There may be a higher chance of success developing a hypersonic glide 
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body box launcher for launching this smaller missile from surface vessels. Monitoring of 
the progress of these smaller missiles and considering their use in a box launcher is 
recommended. 
(6) More Advanced Modeling 
A large number of assumptions went into the times assigned to each of the steps in 
the EFFBDs describing the operation of each candidate systems. Comparable steps across 
the different candidate systems were assigned similar or even identical times to allow the 
results of each simulation to be compared to each other. This allowed the relative 
comparison between candidate system to be made and ratings to be assigned for the system 
analysis. In order to more accurately determine the actual time to launch for each of the 
candidate systems, it is recommended that both personnel who are familiar with the 
operation of the LRHW and the operation of the different vessels used in the candidate 
systems are consulted to determine more accurate timings for each of the steps. By 
determining more accurate timings for each of the steps, simulation of the operation of the 
candidate systems will have higher fidelity results and could be used to provide greater 
differentiation between the candidate systems. Additionally, as more characteristics of the 
hypersonic missile become known or unclassified, modeling that takes into account the 
performance of the missiles could be completed to help determine the optimal number of 
missiles required for a mission set, potentially altering the weight of the Number of AURs 
scored attribute. 
(7) Fleet Planning Around New Hypersonic Missile Capability 
The discussion of AUR storage and the conclusion that 12 AURs likely represents 
the “full” capability that would be needed from this system was based around the idea of a 
single AUR replacing as many as 16 TLAMs. As the Sponsor describes in Appendix A, 
TLAMs that are currently equipped on surface ships can be viewed as displacing missiles 
that might be used in anti-aircraft or anti-submarine missions. The potential for a single 
AUR to free as many as 16 vertical launch system tubes to allow missiles that conduct 
other missions to be loaded onto vessels would increase the flexibility of the vessels when 
it comes to planning their missile armament. It should be noted that the stated 16-to-1 ratio 
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of TLAMs to hypersonic missiles only applies in the mission where a target with active 
defenses is being attacked. In a scenario in which the target is not being actively defended, 
it may be beneficial to have more TLAMs available than to have a single hypersonic 
missile. The availability of more space for alternate armaments in vertical launch systems 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the TLAMs versus hypersonic glide body missiles will 
need to be studied and considered by fleet planners when hypersonic glide body missiles 
become available to surface vessels. 
This additional research, applied to the descriptions and analysis of the candidate 
systems presented in this study, will help to further refine system concerns, requirements, 
activities, and components that will be necessary to successfully deploy a hypersonic glide 
body equipped missile system on a Naval surface vessel in the near future. 
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APPENDIX 
NPS-21-N188, How to Rapidly Bring Hypersonic Missiles to the Fleet, Sponsor 
Input 
CDR Rob Brodie 






I really appreciate the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) pursuing the topic of how 
to rapidly bring hypersonic missiles to the fleet. The ideas that will be explored in this 
thesis have deep personal meaning and the potential to solve operational problems and gain 
tactical advantage. These ideas percolated during 28-years of operational, staff and 
academic experience throughout the world. 
 
The goal of this project is to: 
Help our Navy and joint force incorporate hypersonic missiles as rapidly as 
possible. 
Note: Hypersonic missiles are too large to fit in and their exhaust would overwhelm 
existing internal launching systems like the MK41 VLS. 
 
A byproduct of this project is hopefully: 
The ability to rapidly and inexpensively expand the number of ships able to 
contribute offensive fires. 
• Existing ships well suited for this capability and mission upgrade include 
EPF, LCS, LPD and LSD. 
• Emerging ships well suited for this capability are the Constellation class 
frigate and medium and large unmanned surface vessels (MUSV and 
LUSV). 
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Note: Modifications should have no or minimal required structural changes and any 
modifications should be transparent to the primary vessel tasks or easily removable when 
the vessel is not engaged in hypersonic missile employment.  
 
Hypersonic Missile Demand Signal 
Hypersonic weapons are attractive because of their short response time and how 
difficult they are to counter. I can personally vouch for the higher headquarters desire to 
be able to employ these weapons as soon as possible. 
 
Long Range and Support Fires Demand Signal 
On the SEVENTH Fleet staff, my job was executive officer (XO) of their Naval 
and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE). The NALE integrates naval forces into joint 
fires at the Air Operations Center (AOC). One of the biggest issues was the demand for 
land attack missiles like the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). There are far more 
targets than TLAMs, especially if the conflict is a surprise and friendly forces are not 
already in place. The platforms that currently fire TLAM, destroyers, cruisers, attack 
submarines and guided missile submarines often have competing priorities and flexibility 
issues. Destroyers and cruisers are protecting themselves and the carrier or amphibious 
groups by doing anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-ship warfare. Every TLAM in their 
magazines is an anti-air or anti-submarine weapon not carried. The 96 MK41 VLS cells on 
a destroyer and 128 and a cruiser could be completely filled with anti-air missiles and may 
be inadequate for extended engagements with enemy aircraft, ships, submarines, and land 
based anti-ship forces, especially when decoys are employed. Additionally, it may take 
several TLAMs to service a larger target and especially one protected by an air defense 
system. In addition to TLAM appropriate targets ashore, we have a huge unsatisfied 
demand for fires in support of amphibious landings and friendly land forces. 
 
Crane Launching 
The crane launching idea originated when I was XO of HSV-2 Swift 2006–2008. 
Swift’s charter was to be the risk reduction platform for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 
Swift’s core crew was the same number as the original LCS core crew and the ship had six 
stations in its mission bay capable of embarking and testing the various mission package 
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options LCS was designed to carry. The commercial crane had a 14–20ton capability 
depending on extension to ensure it could handle 11-meter RHIBs, SEAL delivery 
vehicles, the WLD-1 Remote Mine-hunting System and other anticipated or possible 
mission package items. We also had a flight deck and hangar for two SH/MH-60 
helicopters as LCS was expected to embark either a helicopter or hybrid helicopter and 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) detachment. I joined Swift after the testing phase and the 
ship operated as a small, flexible amphibious ship, working for every numbered fleet and 
circumnavigating the globe during the final 30-months of its 5-year lease.  
Shortly after joining the ship in Portsmouth, UK, Swift was the flag ship and afloat 
forward staging base for a combined Royal Navy and Royal Norwegian Navy mine 
countermeasure force during exercise COLD RESPONSE 2006. The only weapons Swift 
had were a 25mm cannon/40mm automatic grenade launcher system on the bow like those 
installed on the U.S. Patrol Combatants (PC), and some .50caliber machineguns. It was 
frustrating to be a sitting duck for any gunboat, helicopter or aircraft simulating an enemy. 
It would have been nice to have a missile system to give them pause. As a leased vessel, 
making significant changes to the superstructure to incorporate a launching system was not 
practical. As the entire ship was aluminum, no missile could safely exhaust on the hull and 
there were no areas to install a box-launcher system other than the flight deck and the ship 
only had one landing spot. The only option to non-invasively arm the ship on short notice 
would be to utilize the crane to hold a missile launcher. The initial idea was the 8-cell 
Harpoon launcher found on U.S. destroyers and cruisers and the X-shape would make it 
easy to hold the launcher tight against the crane with a simple saddle. A control cable back 
to a fire control computer would run on the underside of the crane into the mission bay. 
The missiles would exhaust over the water when the crane was rotated 180-degrees from 
the bow (front) of the ship. The crane being along the same axis of the ship and the missiles 
firing at an upward trajectory perpendicular to the ship’s course, the same orientation if on 
a destroyer or cruiser, would make fire control inputs easier. The Harpoon launcher could 
accommodate SM-1 and SM-2 surface to air missiles, which also have an anti-ship 
capability and SM-1s had been test fired from that launcher on older ships. Several 8-cell 
Harpoon launchers could be stored in the mission bay and moved to the crane via the 
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organic forklift. The launcher would be plugged into the fire control system when being 
lifted up into firing position. 
When Swift was supporting GLOBAL FLEET STATION Central America in 2007, 
the ship visited Port Canaveral and a NASA group asked for a tour. They started measuring 
the flight deck and asking about available electrical power because the ship they used to 
track Space Shuttle launches was having engineering problems and they were looking for 
a back-up as the radar was portable. NASA fixed their ship, but Swift could have supported 
their portable radar. Following that line of thinking, there are portable domestic ballistic 
missile tracking radars and fire control systems that could be plugged into SM-3 or SM-6 
missiles in a launcher suspend from Swift’s crane that would provide a similar capability 
to destroyers we currently assign ballistic missile defense duties. As Japan based destroyers 
are heavily/over tasked, being able to execute single task missions like BMD with EPFs 
would significantly ease their burden and provide the fleet commander with more 
flexibility. Additionally, Swift or an EPF with a modular BMD system would be more 
easily upgradeable as the radar system is easily removable and larger missiles would only 
require larger boxes. 
As the only limit to the size and number of missiles that could be fired in one salvo 
is crane capacity, this capability is well suited to shore bombardment systems like the 
Army/Marine Corps Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Guided Multiple 
Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). 2 ATACMS and 12 GMLRS were carried on the mobile 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and half those numbers on the High Mobility 
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Swift could hold several of the missile boxes that fire 
those missiles from MLRS and HIMARS in the mission bay and launch them from the 
crane with appropriate saddle attachments. Swift or EPF can be quickly converted to do the 
shore bombardment/fire support mission we have neglected since the Vietnam War. 
Longer range targets could be serviced by Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles 
(TLAM) with slightly elongated Harpoon tubes. TLAM and ATACMS became the focus 
of my efforts to make crane launching from Swift’s replacement, EPF (formerly JHSV) a 
reality while XO of SEVENTH Fleet’s Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE) 
2010–2013 and 2016–2019 as there is an almost unlimited appetite for long-range precision 
83 
fires in the Far East. TLAMs are now sourced from destroyers, cruisers and submarines 
that have other missions. Every TLAM loaded onto a cruiser or destroyer displaces an air-
defense missile or anti-submarine rocket (ASROC). The requirement to provide TLAM 
fires on short notice affects the operational flexibility of these ships and submarines. An 
EPF in Korea with a mission bay full of TLAMs able to be launched by its crane would 
significantly reduce the TLAM strike burden on SEVENTH Fleet forces. 
While attending the 2020 Air Force Weapons and Tactics (WEPTAC) conference, 
I enquired about the supersonic Ratlers missile displayed on the Lockheed Martin table 
during Industry Night. The good salesman, who turned out to be the INDOPACOM 
exercise funding point of contact I had worked with via email but never met when 
managing exercises for CTF73, said that ‘supersonic is so last millennium, what you really 
want is hypersonic.’  After his pitch I asked if his hypersonic missile will fit in a MK41 
VLS and he said it wouldn’t by quite a bit but that the dimensions were proprietary and he 
couldn’t tell them to me. At that point I did a bar napkin sketch of the EPF crane launching 
idea and explained its scalability. He sent that to his boss and I had an appointment to visit 
the famed Lockheed Martin Skunk Works in Palmdale, California. When I briefed my 
command after the conference and ran the proposed Skunk Works visit by our JAG, the 
JAG recommended against the visit because I was on active duty and not directly involved 
in acquisitions. 
Shortly after not being able to visit the Skunk Works, the Naval Surface and Mine 
Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), the command I work for, Science Advisor 
put out a call for NPS thesis topic proposals. I submitted a proposal for “How to Rapidly 
Bring Hypersonic Missiles to the Fleet” and mentioned firing them from the crane of an 
EPF as an idea. Some who had a say or knew people who had a say in the ranking and 
funding of NPS thesis topic proposals at COMNAVSURFPAC and U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command had heard of my crane firing idea and understood that the scalability would solve 
the hypersonic missile size problem, so this thesis topic was the #1 ranked and thus funded 
NPS thesis topic for FY21. 
Note: Current San Antonio class LPDs don’t have the large cargo crane (30-ton 
capacity) of the LPDs they replaced and the soon to be retired LSDs. 
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Shipping Container Launchers 
In the fall of 2020, while NPS was putting together this thesis team, Lockheed 
Martin visited SMWDC and briefed their proprietary hypersonic missile launching system 
alternative to the program of record internal launcher for DDG1000 that is still in 
development. Their alternative, which could be placed on the flight deck of their version 
of the LCS, was a 40-foot shipping container that housed a hypersonic missile on an 
automatically erectable launcher with its own gas management (blast ducting) that would 
not require any ship modification. The fire-control, communications and operations were 
contained in a 20-foot shipping container attached to the missile container by a cable. I 
connected the NPS thesis team to the Lockheed Martin representative that briefed SMWDC 
to show the team that a modular fire control and communications system for EPF or other 
non-traditional missile firing platforms was not a significant issue to be overcome. The 
limitation of this system is that only two missiles could be carried on the flight deck of 
either LCS version or an EPF. This system would be ideal for the proposed medium 
unmanned surface vessel as it is being designed to simultaneously support a 40 and 20-foot 
shipping container mission package.  
 
Box Launchers 
A fixed box launcher on the outer edge of a ship where the missile exhausts into 
open air instead of on the ship’s hull is the simplest, provides the most reliable method of 
having a hypersonic missile ready for launch on short notice and is scalable. A bigger 
missile gets a bigger box. This configuration can be seen with the Naval Strike Missiles 
(NSM) on the narrow bow of the trimaran LCS and missile deck of the Constellation class 
frigate being designed. This could also be applied to flight deck edges on ships without 
“catwalks” and after removing the flight deck safety nets. Removal of flight deck nets is a 
simple unbolting of the nets, but re-installation would require a weight test and re-
certification before that flight deck spot could be used. This is not a major issue for LCS 
and EPF as those ships were designed and conceived as single mission platforms. 
Hypersonic weapons employment would be the mission of those platforms when box 
launchers are installed on the port and starboard edges of their flight deck. LPDs and LSDs 
have flight decks large enough for two large helicopters like a CH-53 or four MH-60 sized 
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helicopters. The forward large and small spots could remain available and aircraft could be 
easily moved to and from the hangar if the aft spots were reserved for box launchers. The 
current LPDs and LSDs do not have “catwalks” that would be affected by missile exhaust 
like their predecessors would have. 
Box launchers are very common on naval vessels world-wide, especially smaller 
combatants that do not have internal volume for launchers and exhaust ducting. The Soviets 
expedited the employment of new systems by utilizing fixed box launchers unique to the 
new missile system. Most Western anti-ship cruise missiles have their own unique fixed 
box launchers too. 
 
Vehicle Launchers 
The October 2017 HIMARS missile launch from USS Anchorage (LPD 23) 
validated an idea I had been kicking around since my time on USS Ogden (LPD 5) 1996–
1998. https://news.usni.org/2017/10/24/marines-fire-himars-ship-sea-control-experiment-
navy 
Prior to Ogden’s 1997 deployment, the Marines had to do ship trials for the then 
new M777 155mm howitzer. Having an interest in cannons and knowing the need for fire 
support, I asked one of the civilian technicians if anyone had ever fired an infantry cannon 
from the flight deck of a ship. He said it was tried during the Vietnam War, but that the 
recoil was too severe and broke the flight deck aircraft tie-down pad-eyes used to hold the 
cannon in place. With cannons out of the question, the next idea was the Army multiple 
launch rocket system (MLRS), essentially an armored personnel carrier with two missile 
pods where the troops normally were and a laptop fire control system in the cab. Each pod 
could hold either one ATACMS or six GMLRS. The downfall of this idea was that one or 
both of the large helicopter landing spots would need to be sacrificed, depending on the 
number of vehicles firing. While the aircraft tie-down pad-eyes survived the 2017 shot, a 
$1million blast pad had to be installed to protect the flight deck. 
The Army has a near-term, FY23, solution to rapidly launch a hypersonic missile 
from a ship. They are planning to use a modified Patriot missile transporter/erector/
launcher (TEL) trailer. This could easily operate from a helicopter landing spot, giving an 
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initial salvo of two from an LPD or LSD and one from an EPF and LCS. EPF and LCS 
could have a reload stored in the helicopter parking spot, EPF, or hangar, LCS. The LPD 
or LSD could have multiple spare TELs on their forward flight deck. The LPD could have 
additional TELs stored in its hangar and possibly additional TELs internally stored if able 
to transit the ramps. The LSDs could hold a significant number of TELs in their well deck 
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